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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effects of Elite Decision Making. (May 2009) 
Morgen Steenhagen Johansen,  
B.A., California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo;  
M.A., University of Kansas 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. David A.M. Peterson 
 
Decision making is a central concept in the study of both politics and 
organizations.  Although much research has examined how individuals make decisions, 
there has been substantially less work on the consequences of these decisions.  My 
dissertation focuses on two groups of decision makers, candidates running for office and 
public managers, and the effect of their decisions on the electorate and organization, 
respectively.   
The dissertation explores the impact of candidates’ decisions regarding their 
campaigns on the electorate by examining campaign advertising during the 2000 
Presidential Election.  I focus on two candidate decisions.  The first is to focus on certain 
issues as a way to prime the public to see the candidate as having certain traits, namely 
empathy, morality, and leadership ability. The second is to show voters that the candidate 
is like them by activating (i.e. priming) feelings of social identity among women, 
African-Americans, and Latinos.  Using campaign advertising data and public opinion 
data, I analyze the effect of campaign advertising on voters’ evaluations of the candidates 
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to determine the effectiveness of these strategies.  Results find that an effective strategy 
was for the candidates to air ads describing themselves as having certain traits.  Talking 
about issues does not have much of an effect on voters’ candidate evaluations.  Appeals 
to women were not effective.  Appeals to African-Americans were only effective for the 
Democratic candidate, and appeals to Latinos were only successful for the Republican 
candidate.   
I examine the decisions of public managers by focusing on middle level 
bureaucrats and the consequences of their decisions on their agencies.  The agencies are 
public schools in Texas and the middle managers are principals.  From a dataset of over 
1,000 Texas school districts, I create a measure of principal quality which I then use to 
explore the impact of middle management on multiple school performance measures and 
to compare the influence of principals and superintendents on performance. I also 
examine the effect of principals within in the organization, namely how principals affect 
the turnover of the workers under them. Results find that principals have a direct and 
beneficial influence on organizational performance measures such as standardized test 
scores, college readiness, and turnover.   
To summarize the results more generally, the dissertation finds that the decisions 
actors make within the political process matter in important and significant ways. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF DECISION MAKING 
 
The study of politics is about who gets what, when and how (Lasswell 1950).  In 
other words, politics is about decisions and the consequences of those decisions.  The 
goal of the dissertation is to explore the consequences of decision making within the 
political process by focusing on the effect of political actors’ decisions on their respective 
institutions.  This is a fundamental topic to the study of political science because the 
decisions of political actors such as political candidates and bureaucrats have 
consequences for electoral outcomes, policy, and the overall condition of government and 
the state. 
Chapters II and III examine the impact of candidates’ decisions regarding their 
campaigns on the electorate.  Specifically, I argue that candidates use campaign 
advertising to prime voters to perceive the candidate in a specific and favorable way. 
Chapter II examines the candidate decision to focus on certain issues in campaign 
advertising as a way to prime the public to see the candidate as having certain traits, 
namely empathy, morality, and leadership ability.  Chapter III examines the candidate 
decision to show voters that the candidate is like them. I argue that candidates use 
campaign advertising to activate (i.e. prime) feelings of social identity and this decision 
influences voters’ general feelings toward the candidate. 
 
________________________  
This dissertation follows the style of American Political Science Review. 
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Chapters IV and V focus middle level bureaucrats and the consequences of their 
decisions on their agencies. Specifically, these two chapters examine the impact of 
middle managers on their organization. Chapter IV creates a measure of middle manager 
quality and uses this measure to explore the impact of middle management on multiple 
performance measures and to compare the influence of middle and upper-level 
management on performance.  Chapter V looks at the effect of middle managers within 
in the organization, namely how middle managers affect the turnover of the workers 
under them. 
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CHAPTER II 
ISSUES AND IMAGE: THE INFLUENCE OF ISSUES IN CAMPAIGN 
ADVERTISING ON CANDIDATE TRAIT PERCEPTIONS 
 
Overview 
Candidates behave as if the issues they emphasize affect how the public 
perceives their personal traits such as morality, empathy, and leadership quality.  There 
is, however, no empirical evidence that this behavior is effective.  The aim of this 
chapter is to determine if there is a link between issues and candidate image.  I explore 
the relationship between issues and image by looking at campaign advertising during the 
2000 presidential election.  Data for the cross-sectional time series analysis comes from 
the Wisconsin Advertising Project and the National Annenberg Election Survey.  The 
analysis reveals that the theoretically hypothesized link between certain issues and image 
does not exist.  A discussion of the implications of these findings concludes the chapter.  
 
Introduction 
Candidates behave as if campaign advertising influences perceptions of 
candidates’ personal qualities such as their leadership ability or their compassion.  
Researchers who have explored the effect of campaign advertising on voter perceptions 
of candidates have found that candidates are right.  Political advertising provides voters 
with information, such as policy stances and personal qualities (Gilens, Vavreck, and 
Cohen 2007; Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004; Patterson and McClure 1976); it 
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influences voters’ evaluations of candidates (Atkin and Heald 1976; Kahn and Geer 
1994; West 1994-1995; Atkin et al. 1973) and helps to solidify that impression (Atkin 
and Heald 1976).  
Within the general belief that advertising influences perceptions of candidates is 
the more specific belief held by candidates that they can shape the way the public 
perceives them by the issues they focus on.  In other words, candidates can influence 
how the public perceives them.  Indeed, beginning in the 1950’s and 1960’s, campaigns 
began to focus on a candidate’s image as well as the candidate’s issue positions (Nimmo 
1976; see also Simon 2002).  Thus, in order to make a successful bid for president, a 
candidate must not only strategize about how best to use political advertising to convey 
his campaign messages and issue positions, the candidate must also be mindful of his 
image.1   
This chapter explores the relationship between issues and candidate trait 
perceptions (or image). Specifically, this chapter asks: can candidates control their image 
by focusing on issues?  Although researchers have demonstrated that candidates 
strategically select issues to focus on in their campaigns in order to project a certain 
candidate image (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994; Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004) 
they offer no empirical evidence that such a strategy is effective.  Indeed, the 
fundamental part of this theory and the underlying assumption made by campaign 
                                                
1 I use the terms image and trait perceptions interchangeably.  By candidate image, I refer to attributes of 
candidates’ character rather than the candidate’s appearance.  For example, attributes of a candidate’s 
character is morality or honesty whereas a candidate’s appearance refers to such things as the height or 
weight of the candidate. 
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strategists—that focusing on certain issues affects candidate trait perceptions—has never 
been tested.  
This chapter explores this relationship between issues and image by focusing on 
the candidate traits of morality, empathy, and leadership and the issues linked to these 
traits.  According to the theory of trait ownership, Republican issues such as taxes, 
defense, and family values are linked with leadership and morality (Hayes 2005).  
Democratic issues such as social welfare and social group relations are linked to 
empathy and compassion. The theory of trait ownership, by offering a linkage between 
issues and traits, provides a means to test the relationship between issues and trait 
perceptions, namely to see if candidates can control their image with the issues they 
focus on in their campaign.   
 
Candidate Strategy: Issues and Traits 
Campaign strategists and candidates believe candidate image to be important 
which is why part of a candidate’s campaign strategy is to shape a winning image 
(Simon 2002).  A candidate’s image comprises the character traits of the individual such 
as leadership ability, compassion, and honesty.  According to the literature, candidate 
traits fall into two broad categories, competence and integrity (Funk 1999; Miller, 
Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986; Kinder 1986).  Competence includes specific traits 
such as leadership ability and previous professional experience. Integrity is how honest, 
trustworthy, hard working, down to earth the candidate is.  Three candidate traits matter 
to voters: leadership, integrity, and empathy (Funk 1999; some add morality to this list, 
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see Hayes 2005).  These candidate traits influence candidate evaluations (Miller, 
Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986; Kinder 1986; Nimmo 1976; Shyles 1984; Kiousis, 
Bantimaroudis, and Ban 1999; Markus 1982), which in turn affect the vote (Bartels 
2002; Goren 2002; Hayes 2005; Funk 1999; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986; 
although see Bartels 2000); more favorable evaluations increase the likelihood of voting 
for a candidate (Markus 1982).   
A candidate’s image matters and candidates attempt to control their image.  One 
strategy is stress the character traits they would bring to the office.  Simply, the 
candidate focuses on his leadership experience, honesty, or compassion.    However, this 
strategy is limited in that there is little a candidate can do to persuade voters to see a 
candidate as honest when the candidate is Nixon after Watergate.  What candidates can 
do is try to show voters the traits they do have, thereby influencing voters’ trait 
perceptions of candidates.   
Another way to demonstrate character traits is by focusing on issues that make 
the candidate appear to be compassionate, tough, honest, experienced, etc.  John F. 
Kennedy’s campaign strategy was to project an image of a person who was bold, 
competent, and focused on moving the country forward (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994, 536).  
The strategic objective was to highlight a few policies—policies selected by polling 
Americans on what they considered the most important problem facing the country—by 
increasing the frequency, strength, and extensiveness of the candidate’s statements.  By 
doing this, the Kennedy campaign hoped to construct an image of Kennedy that was 
different from and more appealing than Nixon (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994).   
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Nixon’s presidential strategy in 1972 was similar to Kennedy’s (Druckman, 
Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004). Nixon selected issues to focus on in his campaign that 
would favor his image.  Nixon would monitor how voters perceived him with polls and 
when the public negatively evaluated his competence and strength, he devoted more 
attention to an issue that highlighted Nixon’s ability to bring peace to America and to 
handle international problems—foreign policy.  Thus, Nixon’s strategy was to use issues 
as a means to affect how the public evaluated his personal characteristics. 
The strategy is to talk about issues as a way to signal that the candidate cares 
about the issue (JFK in 1960) or has the necessary traits to deal with the issue (Nixon in 
1972). This strategy assumes that issues and candidate image are linked, specifically that 
voters use issues to infer traits.   Research on the relationship between specific issue 
positions and specific traits found that citizens are more likely to infer a candidate’s 
traits from the candidate’s issue position than they are to infer from the traits of a 
candidate to the candidate’s issue positions (Rapoport, Metcalf, and Hartman 1989).2  
However, although they are linked, conceptually traits are separate from issues.  
Trait perceptions are judgments of a candidate personally, which is separate from 
politics (i.e. political ideology, they would like to see government changed, etc.) 
(Peterson 2005). Character traits such as morality or empathy are equally valued among 
the population; everyone wants an honest president.  In regards to political judgments, 
voters and candidates disagree about whether a candidate from one party is more 
                                                
2 However, this is only when both the candidate and respondent agreed on the issue (government 
providing jobs). 
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desirable than a candidate from the other party (Peterson 2005).  Trait perceptions are 
about the candidate as a person, not their politics.   
By talking about issues, candidates focus voters’ attention on certain issues, 
which leads voters to place more weight on those issues when evaluating a candidate or 
the President (Johnston et al. 1992; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Druckman 2004).   In 
other words, candidates prime citizens to use those issues when choosing among 
candidates  (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Jacobs and Shapiro 1994; Petrocik 
1996; Druckman and Holmes 2004).  They affect vote choice by changing the 
importance of the issue and by sending signals to voters that a candidate cares about an 
issue (Simon 2002).  The literature on campaign strategy shows us that candidates use 
this strategy and the literature on priming tells us how it would work. 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine if candidates can affect their image 
with the issues they focus on in their campaign.  Looking to the research on the 
relationship between issues and image reveals three things. First, although it tells us that 
candidates try to shape perceptions of their image by focusing on certain issues during 
the campaign (Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004; Jacobs and Shapiro 1994), it 
does not tell us if such a strategy is effective. Second, although it tells us that voters infer 
traits from issue positions, it does not tell us how trait perceptions are affected when 
candidates talk about an issue.  Last, although it tells us that voters can be primed to 
focus on certain issues when evaluating a candidate, it does not tell us how focusing on 
certain issues affect trait perceptions. In sum, we do not know if candidates can control 
their image with the issues they talk about.   
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Influencing Trait Perceptions 
Trait perceptions are formed in two ways.  One way is direct; the candidate 
simply states he has a trait and voters either believe him or not.  The second way trait 
perceptions are formed is indirectly; traits are derived from the candidate’s focus on 
specific issues.  Specifically, since candidate traits are not directly observable, they must 
be inferred from the behavior of the candidate (Fiske and Taylor 1991).  Since voters 
rarely see the candidate’s behavior in person, they must gather this information from 
sources such as televised speeches and campaign advertising.  Campaign advertising 
provides voters with a way to observe candidate behavior and thereby infer candidate 
traits. 
Recall that the strategy is to focus on issues that lead voters to infer certain traits 
(such as Nixon focusing on foreign policy to affect perceptions of his competence).  If 
this theory is correct, then we should see a correlation between trait perceptions and 
issue ads.  However, in order to determine which issues lead voters to infer certain trait 
perceptions, we need to understand the connection voters make between issues and 
traits.  By this, I mean how voters connect an issue such as healthcare with empathy 
(Hayes 2005).  The theory of trait ownership provides a means to link specific issues 
with specific traits.   
The theory of trait ownership posits that each political party owns traits that are 
associated with the issues each party owns.  This theory arises from the theory of issue 
ownership which argues that each party owns those issues that they have handled well in 
the past (Petrocik 1996).  Democrats own issues of social welfare and social group 
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relations and Republicans own issues related to defense, taxes, and family values.  
According to the theory of trait ownership, these issues create and reinforce candidate 
trait perceptions (Hayes 2005, 909). Republican issues are linked to leadership and 
morality and Democratic issues are linked with empathy.  Because a party owns certain 
issues, the public perceives candidates from that party as having certain traits associated 
with those issues.   
The link between issues and traits occurs because of candidate behavior that is a 
function of the candidate’s political party.  The party of the candidate exerts an 
enormous influence on the issues a candidate focuses on.  Democrats are the party of the 
elderly, the worker, and the less fortunate and have a history of supporting policies to 
expand social welfare programs.  Given this, Democratic candidates campaign at nursing 
homes, hospitals, factories, and daycare centers to demonstrate that they care about their 
constituency and their concerns. While campaigning at these places, the candidate 
discusses social welfare issues such as improving Medicare and social security.  This 
behavior allows the voter to infer that the candidate is concerned with helping those who 
need it—that the candidate is empathetic.  The result is a link between social welfare 
issues and empathy.   
 For Republicans, the party is comprised of business interests, the upper and 
middle classes, and social conservatives.  Republicans, therefore, favor policies 
regarding law and order, tax cuts, military and defense spending, and family values.  
When campaigning, Republican candidates hold events on military bases, at churches, 
and business councils (Hayes 2005). This behavior, in addition to the rhetoric 
 11 
Republican candidates use that stresses individualism and toughness, leads voters to 
infer that the candidate is moral and a strong leader; voters link Republican issues with 
leadership and morality. 
Thus, due to the issues owned by the parties, Republicans are perceived to be 
stronger leaders and more moral.  Democrats are seen as more compassionate and 
empathetic than Republicans (Hayes 2005). Although Hayes (2005) does not perform a 
direct test of this link between specific issues and specific traits, the theory of trait 
ownership provides a theoretical link between certain issues and traits that allows for a 
more direct test.  According to the theory of trait ownership, we would expect voters to 
connect family values, defense, and monetary issues (Republican issues) with leadership 
and morality (Republican traits) and connect social welfare issues (Democratic issues) 
with empathy (Democratic trait). 
Hypotheses 
To explore the relationship between issues and image, I focus first on the direct 
way trait perceptions are formed: the candidate states they have a trait and the voter 
believes the candidate or not.  For example, candidates may advertise themselves as 
being a strong leader or as being caring in an effort to shape voter perceptions of them 
on those traits.  If this is accurate, we would expect that when candidates use their 
campaign advertising to describe themselves as having certain traits, voters will perceive 
the candidates as having those traits.  The first hypothesis is that candidates can affect 
their image by advertising themselves as having particular traits.  
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Hypothesis 1: When campaign advertising focuses on certain traits, voters will 
perceive the candidate as having those traits.   
In other words, campaign advertising describing the candidate’s personality traits 
influences voter trait perceptions of the candidate.  
However, we are ultimately interested in knowing if candidates can affect trait 
perceptions with the issues they choose to focus on; we want to know if there is a 
linkage between particular traits and particular issues.  Relying on the theory of trait 
ownership, we would expect that when candidates focus on social issues such as 
education, health care, and social security in their ads, voters would perceive the 
candidate as being empathetic.  When candidates focus on monetary issues such as taxes 
and the budget, we would expect voters to perceive the candidate as being a strong 
leader and moral.  
Hypothesis 2a: When campaign advertising focuses on social welfare issues, 
voters will perceive the candidate as having empathy. 
Hypothesis 2b: When campaign advertising focuses on monetary issues, voters 
will perceive the candidate as being a strong leader and as having morality. 
These hypotheses explore the ways candidates can affect trait perceptions with their 
campaign advertising: by describing themselves as having certain traits and with specific 
issues to influence certain trait perceptions.  
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Campaign 2000 
 The 2000 election offers an opportunity to test these hypotheses.  In the 2000 
election, the Republican candidate attempted to take over typically Democratic issues, 
most notably education and social security, but in a manner consistent with Republican 
values (Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson 2004).  In 2000, the candidates attempted to 
project a certain image (Bush and his compassionate conservatism) or overcome a 
negative image (Gore and his honesty).  Gore was trying to distance himself from 
Clinton and, while experienced and intelligent, was perceived as being dishonest.  While 
the media saddled Bush with an image of a man who was not very bright and lacked 
competence, Bush succeeded at being the candidate people would most like to sit around 
and have a beer with.   
Each candidate in the 2000 election had positive and negative candidate images 
and made efforts to shift their image.3  The candidates attempted to shape their images 
with their behavior and speeches at the conventions and during the debates (Johnston, 
Hagen, and Jamieson 2004).  Gore tried to overcome his stiffness by passionately kissing 
his wife on stage.  Bush tried to overcome his dimness by emphasizing his 
compassionate side and focusing on his morality in speeches and during the debates, 
while also challenging Gore’s untrustworthiness (Johnston, Hagen and Jamieson 2004).    
Another candidate strategy was to focus on issues in campaign advertising to 
affect their image. The most numerous issues discussed in the campaign were taxes, the 
budget, the environment, education, health care, social security, Medicare, and 
                                                
3 Of course, during the campaign, Bush was creating his image while Gore already had a public image and 
thus was faced with the task of changing his image.   
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children’s issues.  If the candidates believe that issues affect image, candidates who want 
to appear empathetic or caring will talk about issues such as education, health care, the 
environment, and social security in their ads.  This is exactly what Bush did in trying to 
project his image of a compassionate conservative.  Indeed, although he didn’t ‘own’ 
these social welfare issues, his image benefited from focusing on those issues (Hayes 
2005).  Candidates who want to appear as a strong leader will talk about issues such as 
taxes, foreign policy, and law and order (i.e. crime) in their ads (Hayes 2005).  However, 
by virtue of the party they are representing, the candidates come with a set of traits that 
are associated with their respective party although candidates may try to co-opt the other 
candidate’s traits (Hayes 2005).  Except for the issues of foreign policy and crime, both 
candidates focused on all of these issues in their campaign ads. 
  
Data and Methods 
 This chapter combines two datasets to explore the connection between issues and 
candidate image.  The data has two dimensions, a temporal dimension and a spatial 
dimension.  The time series is a weekly time series.  The spatial dimension is the media 
market the respondent lives in and the market in which the ads were aired.  There are 47 
weeks in the time series and 62 markets.  The combined dataset is a pooled cross-
sectional time series in which multiple values exist for each week because the data is 
grouped by media market and week.  There could potentially be 62 values for week 1 
because there are 62 media markets that can have a value for each week.        
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Trait Perceptions  
The first part of the dataset comes from the 2000 National Annenberg Election 
Survey.4  This dataset features a national rolling cross-sectional survey that ran from 
December of 1999 through the last day before the election.  I constructed the dependent 
variables from this dataset.  The dependent variables are the mean weekly trait 
perceptions for each media market of both Bush and Gore on three traits: morality, 
leadership, and empathy.  To get these measures, I aggregated the individual level 
responses by media market and by week to the following prompts to get the dependent 
variables.  For empathy, respondents rated how well the word 'cares' describes the 
candidate.  For morality, respondents rated how well the word ‘honest’ describes the 
candidate.5  For leadership, respondents rated how well the word ‘strong leadership’ 
describes the candidate.  Values range from 1 through 4; higher values mean the public 
perceived the candidate as having more of that trait.  Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 present the 
trend over time in the average trait perceptions for each candidate for all media markets 
combined.   
As shown in Figure 2.1, average trait perceptions of empathy for Gore were 
higher during the election than Bush, which is expected.  Both candidates drop in 
empathy around week 22 (starting May 19th) and trait perceptions of Gore jump during 
the Democratic National Convention during week 35.  It is interesting to note that there 
were points during the election when Bush was perceived as having slightly more 
                                                
4 For more information on this dataset, (i.e. survey methodology and coding) see Romer et al. 2004. 
5 The closest adjective to ‘moral’ in the survey was ‘honest’.   
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empathy; Bush’s attempts to be seen as a compassionate conservative may have been 
effective.   
 
 
  
Figure 2.1: Weekly Average Perceptions of Empathy 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the variance in perceptions of Bush and Gore’s leadership.  
Bush started with high perceptions of leadership but, by time of the election, the 
candidates were about even in terms of perceptions of their leadership (although 
perceptions of Gore’s leadership were slightly lower than Bush’s). Leadership trait 
perceptions for Bush increased during the time of the first debate (week 43).  There are 
weeks when Gore came close to Bush, but as expected, Bush was the leadership 
candidate.  
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Figure 2.2: Weekly Average Perceptions of Leadership 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 shows average trait perceptions of morality for Bush and Gore.  At the 
beginning of the campaign, morality perceptions of both candidates were fairly similar.  
Candidate trait perceptions of morality track each other until week 22 (starting May 
19th) when Bush starts to lead in morality as perceptions of Gore’s decreased.  By the 
Election, perceptions of Gore’s morality were lower than Bush; Bush ended up as the 
morality candidate.  
In sum, at the time the election occurred, the public perceived Bush as being 
more moral and having slightly more leadership whereas Gore was perceived as having 
slightly more empathy.  This is not surprising given that Republicans are perceived as 
being strong leaders and more moral and Democrats are seen as being more empathetic 
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generally (Hayes 2005).  There is variation in trait perceptions of the candidates.  In 
order to determine how campaign advertising influenced the variation in candidate trait 
perceptions, I need data about campaign advertising. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Weekly Average Perceptions of Morality 
 
 
 
 
Campaign Advertising 
The second part of the dataset comes from the Wisconsin Advertising Project.6  
This dataset contains all of the ads aired during the 2000 presidential election that favor 
                                                
6 The data was obtained from a project of the Wisconsin Advertising Project, under Professor Kenneth 
Goldstein and Joel Rivlin of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and included media tracking data from 
the Campaign Media Analysis Group in Washington, D.C.  The Wisconsin Advertising Project was 
sponsored by a grant from The Pew Charitable Trusts.  The opinions expressed in this article are those of 
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Wisconsin Advertising Project, Professor 
Goldstein, Joel Rivlin, or The Pew Charitable Trusts. 
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either Bush or Gore.  There are almost 250,000 ads aired between December 1999 and 
November 7, 2000.  Fifty-two percent of the ads favored Bush while 48% of the ads 
favored Gore.  The main independent variables of interest come from this dataset and 
fall into two categories.  The first category comprises ads that describe the candidate as 
having empathy, leadership skills, or morality.7  These variables are simply the number 
of ads aired each week in each media market for each candidate that describe the 
candidate as being empathetic, having morality, or being a strong leader.  
 The second category contains the issue ads.  The main issues discussed in the 
campaign were taxes, the budget/deficit, education, the environment, health care, social 
security, Medicare, and children’s issues. Table 2.1 presents the percentage of ads Bush 
and Gore each aired that provided candidate traits and focused on the eight issues named 
above.       
 As shown in Table 2.1, there are some issues that a candidate tried to claim and 
others that both were trying to control.  Gore had more ads about taxes, the environment, 
and health care than Bush while Bush had more ads about the budget/surplus, education, 
and social security.  Bush and Gore had relatively the same percentage of ads about 
children’s issues and Medicare.  Both candidates attempted to co-opt the other’s issues 
(Gore and taxes and Bush and social security and education).   
The theory of trait ownership does not link specific issues with specific traits but 
rather links types of issues with traits.   Theoretically, it is more appropriate to focus on 
                                                
7 In regards to morality, due to the lack of ads that used the adjective of ‘moral’ to describe the candidate, 
this measure includes the adjectives ‘committed’ and ‘principled’.   
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the effect of certain types of issues on image rather than specific issues.8  The issues are 
divided into two categories: social welfare issues and fiscal issues.  The social welfare 
issues measure is the weekly number of ads on social welfare issues aired for each 
candidate in each media market.  The fiscal issues measure is the weekly number of ads 
on taxes and the budget/deficit aired for each candidate in each media market. 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: Percent of Ads about Traits and  
Issues Aired in the 2000 Election  
    Bush Gore 
        
Empathy   0% 0.40% 
       
Leadership   7% 3% 
       
Morality   7% 2% 
       
Taxes   16% 28% 
       
Deficit/Budget   21% 12% 
       
Education   48% 16% 
       
Health Care   23% 39% 
       
Medicare   10% 12% 
       
Social Security   38% 15% 
       
Children's Issues   10% 8% 
       
Environment   3% 18% 
        
 
 
 
 
                                                
8 I did run the models with measures for the separate issues.  These models are presented in tables A-2.1 
and A-2.2 in the appendix.   
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Statistical Method    
As previously mentioned, I combined these two datasets by market and by time 
to create a dataset to test the assumption that issues affect candidate trait perceptions.  A 
lagged dependent variable was also included in each model to account for past trait 
perceptions.  I estimate the models using Beck and Katz’s (1995) recommended method 
for analyzing pooled cross-sectional time series data, ordinary least squares regression 
with panel corrected standard errors.9  Table 2.2 presents the results from the three 
models predicting candidate trait perceptions of Bush.  Table 2.3 presents the results 
from the three models predicting candidate trait perceptions of Gore.   
 
Results 
Bush 
For Bush, the most successful strategy was airing ads describing his morality.  
Campaign advertising only affected morality perceptions of Bush.   Ads describing Bush 
as having morality had a significant and positive effect on perceptions of Bush’s 
morality.  This means that as more ads were aired describing Bush’s morality, 
perceptions of Bush’s morality increased.  This result provides some support for 
hypothesis 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 The data meet the necessary requirement of no autocorrelation. 
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Table 2.2: Models Predicting Average Weekly Trait Perceptions of Bush 
Note: Dependent Variable is average weekly trait perceptions of Bush’s traits.  Values range from 1-4.  
Method is OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995).  Bolded coefficients are 
significant at p > 0.05 
 
 
 
In regards to hypothesis 2, according to the theory, we should see a clear link 
between social welfare issues and empathy and fiscal issues and leadership.  
Unfortunately, there is not one.  The fiscal issues should also have an effect on morality 
perceptions.  This too is not the case. There is a link, however, between social welfare 
issue ads and morality, although the relationship is negative.  When Bush aired more ads 
about social welfare issues, perceptions of his morality decreased.  Bush’s focus on 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Traits
Leadership -0.068 0.081 -0.080 0.080 -0.038 0.030
Morality 0.125 0.095 0.042 0.168 0.143 0.047
Issues
Social Welfare Issues 0.024 0.014 -0.004 0.016 -0.017 0.007
Fiscal Issues -0.027 0.021 0.017 0.024 0.023 0.019
Controls
Republican Convention 0.043 0.046 0.092 0.010
Democratic Convention 0.068 0.049 -0.192 0.053 -0.004 0.016
1st Debate -0.011 0.069 0.017 0.053 -0.015 0.034
2nd Debate -0.165 0.078 0.006 0.093 -0.033 0.030
3rd Debate 0.097 0.037 -0.082 0.107 0.010 0.038
Lagged D.V. 0.214 0.017 0.360 0.038 0.270 0.020
Constant 1.965 0.042 1.908 0.138 1.89 0.050
N
Number of Groups
Wald Chi-square
Prob. Of Chi-square
Empathy Leadership Morality
2286 775 2283
61 61 61
459.89 654.99 645.60
0.001 0.001 0.001
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typically Democratic issues negatively affected the Republican stereotype of being more 
moral. Perhaps because there was relatively no mention of family values or moral issues 
during the campaign, voters were unable to infer morality from issues for Bush.  These 
results provide little support for hypothesis 2. 
 
 
 
Table 2.3: Models Predicting Average Weekly Trait Perceptions of Gore  
Note: Dependent Variable is average weekly trait perceptions of Gore’s traits.  Values range from 1-4.  
Method is OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995).  Bolded coefficients are 
significant at p > 0.05. 
 
 
 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Traits
Leadership 0.001 0.104 0.263 0.039 0.048 0.119
Morality -0.176 0.273 0.251 0.107 0.268 0.047
Empathy 0.301 0.542 -0.124 0.185 -0.113 0.134
Issues
Social Welfare Issues -0.005 0.006 0.019 0.025 0.019 0.013
Fiscal Issues 0.018 0.015 -0.026 0.037 -0.048 0.017
Controls
Republican Convention 0.073 0.031 -0.016 0.027
Democratic Convention -0.052 0.036 0.150 0.014 0.066 0.023
1st Debate -0.002 0.056 -0.029 0.055 -0.143 0.025
2nd Debate 0.040 0.077 -0.096 0.068 -0.142 0.029
3rd Debate -0.041 0.074 0.108 0.046 0.130 0.010
Lagged D.V. 0.285 0.018 0.274 0.039 0.209 0.016
Constant 1.709 0.042 1.748 0.086 2.014 0.040
N
Number of Groups
Wald Chi-square
Prob. Of Chi-square 0.001
Empathy
459.89 16798.77 8670.55
Leadership Morality
2288 775 2287
61
0.001 0.001
61 61
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Gore 
 For Gore, the most successful strategy was airing ads about his leadership and 
morality.  Ads describing Gore’s leadership and morality had a positive and significant 
influence on perceptions of Gore’s leadership; as more ads were aired that focused on 
Gore’s leadership, perceptions of Gore’s leadership increased.  Perceptions of Gore’s 
morality increased by ads describing Gore’s morality and leadership.  This result 
provides support for hypothesis 1.    
In regards to hypothesis 2, again if we look to the issues and traits that have the 
clearest connection (empathy and leadership), there is no relationship.  For Gore, airing 
fiscal issue ads did have an effect on morality, which accords with the theory.  However, 
this relationship is negative which means that as more ads were aired about fiscal issues, 
perceptions of Gore’s morality decreased.  There is little support for hypothesis 2.  
 
Conclusions 
The most effective strategy for both candidates was to air ads describing 
themselves as having certain traits (Bush and morality, Gore and leadership and 
morality).  This supports the first hypothesis that ads describing the candidate’s traits 
influences trait perceptions.  This strategy was likely more effective for Gore than Bush 
because he was the better known candidate.  He was able to remind voters of his 
qualities whereas Bush had to persuade voters of his character.     
Hypothesis 2 tests the assumption that specific issues influence specific trait 
perceptions.  If this assumption were true, we would have found a strong relationship 
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between social welfare issues and empathy.  Instead, we found relationships not 
predicted by the theory.  Specifically, we found that perceptions of both candidates’ 
morality was hurt by focusing on their opponent’s owned issues.  For Bush, this was 
talking about social welfare issues and for Gore this was talking about fiscal issues.  In 
addition to challenging the assumption of the issues to image link, this result suggests 
that co-opting the other party’s issues may not be as beneficial as Hayes (2005) supposes 
it to be.   
These results demonstrate that the relationship between issues and image is more 
complex than the literature describes.  Perhaps issues can only affect perceptions of 
candidate traits when both candidates are found lacking in regards to that trait.  
Campaign advertising had the most influence on perceptions of both candidates’ 
morality.  Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson (2004) write that both candidates’ credibility 
and trustworthiness were called into doubt at different times during the campaign.  Since 
both candidates were considered lacking in morality, the candidates may have made 
more of an effort to be the ‘moral’ candidate.  Since voters did not receive a clear 
message about the candidates’ morality, they needed ads to infer morality.  Ads about 
family values were not available so they made inferences with the ads available.   
Candidates behave as if the issues they focus on affect their image and political 
scientists assume that this is the case.  This underlying assumption that issues affect 
candidate image is not true, at least according to this study.  Perhaps candidates have 
insider information about the link between issues and image that political scientists do 
not. Nevertheless, while it is reasonable to make assumptions from time to time in order 
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to theorize about how people make decisions or behave in regards to politics, it is 
necessary to test these assumptions at some point.  This chapter illustrates that 
sometimes our theories and assumptions are not as simple as we wish them to be.  Only 
by testing assumptions can we ascertain that our theories about the way politics works 
are indicative of what happens in the real world. 
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CHAPTER III 
TRIGGERING SOCIAL IDENTITY WITH CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING: 
THE CUES CANDIDATES USE AND THEIR EFFECT ON VOTERS’ 
CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS 
 
Overview 
Although there is much work on social identity theory, there is relatively little 
research that explores the connection between social identity and campaigns.  This 
chapter proposes that candidates use campaign advertising to trigger voters’ feelings of 
social identity.  Specifically, this chapter examines the cues candidates provide in their 
ads to trigger social identity and how well those signals influence candidate evaluations.  
This chapter focuses on two social identities candidates may emphasize in their ads to 
influence how voters perceive them: race and gender.  The relationship between social 
identity cues and candidate evaluations is explored with multilevel models that allow for 
an individual level focus.  Results are discussed within the social identity literature and 
more broadly within the literature on how campaigns, and campaign advertising, affect 
voters and their evaluation of candidates.  
 
Introduction 
Political campaigns are important because they are attempts by candidates to 
influence how citizens see the political world (Schmitt-Beck 2007).  Candidates believe 
they can influence voters with the campaign, namely by persuading and motivating 
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voters.  However, although political science research has focused on motivation 
(turnout) and persuasion (vote choice), we do not know much about the process that 
makes these attempts to motivate and persuade successful.  Indeed, fundamental to the 
study of campaigns is how candidates attempt to influence voting behavior and how 
successful those attempts are (Hillygus and Shields 2008; Sulkin and Swigger 2008; 
Shea and Burton 2006; Schaffner 2005).  A focus on the influence that candidate 
strategy has on voters allows us to gain a greater understanding of the campaign process 
and how and why the campaign shapes how voters perceive candidates.  
The literature on campaign strategy examines the different variables candidates 
take into account when putting together a campaign.  The candidate must be aware of 
what the voter expects a candidate to act and sound like.  Voters expect that Democrats 
will talk about Democratic issues and Republicans will talk about Republican issues (see 
Petrocik 1996 and his theory of issue ownership).  The candidate also must strategize on 
ways to get media coverage and how to get the media to portray them in a way that is 
consistent with the image the candidate wishes to portray.  Another strategy, and the one 
this chapter focuses on, is the strategy to influence how voters perceive the candidate, 
specifically how favorable voters find the candidate. This strategy relies on providing 
cues to voters.   
Candidates want to provide cues to voters because voters rely heavily on 
shortcuts (cues, signals, and symbols) to make political decisions (Valentino, Traugott, 
and Hutchings 2002; Vavreck 2001). Given the limited amount of time voters give to 
politics, cues are necessary to help voters deal with the barrage of information they face 
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during a campaign. Indeed, political cues have a significant affect on voter’s perceptions 
of candidates (Conover 1981). Thus, candidates send signals or cues to voters that are 
meaningful to voters—cues that result in beneficial outcomes for the candidate.   
The most influential cues are those that reflect the characteristics of the voter.  
Social identity, such as one’s partisanship, race, gender, religion, or occupation, has a 
significant influence on how people see the world and politics.  Candidates can influence 
how voters evaluate them by providing cues that the candidate is like them, leading to a 
more favorable evaluation of the candidate (Kern 1989).  This chapter examines the use 
of racial and gender social identity cues by candidates and the effect of these cues on 
voters’ evaluations of the candidates.  First, I explain the theory of social identity and 
why providing social identity cues would benefit the candidates.  Second, I discuss the 
three social groups candidates may try to appeal to (women, African-Americans, and 
Latino/as) with social identity cues and my expectations on how voters in these social 
groups would respond.  Next, I present the data and methods followed by the results of 
the models.  The chapter concludes with a discussion on how to further incorporate 
social identity theory into the study of campaigns and why the study of campaigns would 
benefit from doing so.    
 
Social Identity Theory 
Candidates strategically use campaign advertising to provide symbols of group 
identification to alert the voter that the candidate is one of them. Campaigns are 
essentially about communication—communication of information to voters about the 
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candidates and policy. Televised campaign advertising provides a means to 
communicate with voters.  In addition, campaign advertising allows candidates to make 
a connection with the voter. The use of symbols in campaign advertising creates a bond 
by signaling to the voter that the candidate is like the voter, which leads to a favorable 
rating of the candidate by the voter (Kern 1989). Candidates can affect how they are 
evaluated by voters with cues that identify the candidate as like the voter—someone who 
belongs to the voter’s in-group. 
Social identity theory posits that people see themselves as members of various 
groups that they feel they identify with; these groups are in-groups (Tajfel and Turner 
1986; Fiske and Taylor 1991).  Such things as a person’s partisanship, ethnicity, gender, 
class, and occupation all comprise a person’s social identity.  People in the in-group are 
favored over those in the out-group (those who are not members of the in-group).  This 
in-group favoritism occurs even when there is no personal advantage or even when there 
is a disadvantage to doing so (Turner, Brown, and Tajfel 1979).  Moreover, in-group 
favoritism can occur when social identity is not entirely salient or conscious (Fiske and 
Taylor 1991).     
This in-group/out-group dynamic is extremely powerful in influencing an 
individual’s attitudes.  Indeed, voters respond more favorably to candidates that are in 
the in-group and respond less favorably to those in the out-group (Judd and Downing 
1995) and these evaluations are stronger (Conover 1981). Thus, candidates can use cues 
to show the voter the candidate is like them (i.e. part of the in-group).  The candidate can 
do this by providing social identity cues.  In other words, candidates use social identity 
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cues in campaign advertising in an attempt to identify himself with various groups in 
order to gain favor with those groups.   
These social identity cues can be things such as the candidates’ party 
identification, endorsements from various groups, or even a setting or location like a 
church or a school (Kern 1989). This is because it does not take much to activate in-
group/out-group feelings.  Something as simple as the presence of someone from the 
social group can be enough of a cue to trigger social identity.  Such a cue would signal to 
someone in the social group that the candidate is an in-group member.  The person in the 
ad is a signal to the voter that the candidate considers the in-group an important part of 
his constituency.  For example, an ad where the candidate is shown speaking in front of 
a group that includes Latinos shows that Latinos make up the candidate’s constituency, 
which associates the candidate with the in-group.   
A stronger cue that the candidate is like the voter is if an in-group member is 
speaking in the ad.  Having someone from the targeted social group speaking in the ad 
not only demonstrates to the voter that the social group is part of the candidate’s 
constituency but that an in-group member supports and speaks in favor of the candidate.  
The result is an association of the candidate with the in-group.  Because of the positivity 
bias in-group members have for others in their social group, we would expect the cues 
will be effective in showing the voter that the candidate is an in-group member and that 
the use of these cues by the candidates will lead to more favorable evaluations of the 
candidates.  
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Social Identities: Gender and Race  
In regards to politics, the most important and influential social identity is 
partisanship (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).  However, in the past few decades, 
the rise in the importance of gender and race to electoral outcomes reveals that these 
social identities also matter (Mueller 1988; Dawson 1994; DeSipio 1996).   
Women 
Women, as a voting bloc, have played an important role in national elections 
since 1980 (Schaffner 2005).  At 56% of voters, they comprise more than half of the 
voting population.  Although women are more likely to vote Democratic, their support 
for Democratic candidates varies depending on the issues the candidates discuss during 
the campaign. In addition, women are more likely to be persuaded by campaigns since 
they are less likely to have a favored candidate until right before the election; the 
importance of gender on electoral outcomes is affected by campaigns. Thus, candidates 
strategically target women to influence how women perceive them and women respond 
to these appeals (Schaffner 2005).10  
Since women are more persuadable, we would expect equal amounts of cues 
from both Democratic and Republican candidates. Moreover, we would expect that 
women would respond to these cues.  However, although one’s sex comprises one’s 
social identity, women may have less of a collective identity than other social groups 
(Gurin 1985).  Therefore, appeals to gender identity may not be effective.  Nevertheless, 
                                                
10 Moreover, since most candidates are male, women have to rely on other cues besides candidate sex to 
evaluate a candidate.  However, male candidates can still signal to women that they are like them. 
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I hypothesize that gender social group cues will lead to women rating both candidates 
more favorably. 
African-Americans 
 African-Americans overwhelmingly vote Democratic (Dawson 1994).  
Candidates from either party may not include black social identity cues because such a 
strategy will likely not affect candidate evaluations much—blacks are not likely to vote 
for a Republican candidate and Democrats can count on their vote regardless.  In 
addition, there is another dimension to using signals to trigger black social identity—
priming racial attitudes.  When white voters’ racial attitudes become criteria to evaluate 
candidates, racial resentment toward blacks leads to negative feelings toward the 
candidate most closely tied with blacks—the Democratic candidate (Mendelberg 
2001;Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002).  Thus, black social identity cues can affect 
black attitudes about candidates and non-black attitudes as well.   
Since the African-American social group is very cohesive group (they share a 
linked fate (Dawson 1994)), candidate appeals to black social identity should be 
effective but only if they come from the Democratic Party.  Although there is little 
reason for Republican candidates to appeal to black social identity,11 doing so may lead 
to slightly higher, albeit still low, favorability ratings. I hypothesize that black social 
group cues will lead to blacks rating the Democratic candidate more favorably but not 
the Republican candidate.      
 
                                                
11 Republican candidates may use black social identity cues to affect the few African-Americans who do 
not always vote Democratic (i.e. black Republicans). 
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Latinos 
Latinos are a ‘new electorate’ (DeSipio 1996).  Indeed, political pundits hailed 
the 1980’s as the ‘decade of the Hispanic’ due to the increasing population of Latinos in 
the United States.  Although Latinos have historically voted primarily Democratic, 
increases in Latino’s socioeconomic status and social conservatism have led to 
increasing numbers of Latinos preferring Republican candidates (Alvarez and Bedolla 
2003).  Moreover, the increase of Latino participation in the electorate has only just 
recently occurred and the parties do not yet know how much they may matter for the 
election.   
Thus, we would expect that candidates from both parties will make a concerted 
effort to use cues to show Latinos the candidate is like them.  A Republican candidate’s 
attempt may be greater than that of a Democratic candidate in an effort to attract more 
Latinos to the Republican candidate and the party. Conversely, Democrats may send 
Latino social identity cues in an effort to keep them voting Democratic.  However, 
Latinos do not form a cohesive social group.  The classification of Latino comprises 
three main groups (those of Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto-Rican ancestry) and there is 
variation in political ideology among them.  Nevertheless, we would expect Latino 
social identity cues from both candidates and their effect to be beneficial to both 
candidates. Latino social group cues will lead to Latinos rating both candidates more 
favorably.    
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Data and Methods 
To explore the use of social identity cues by the candidates and their effect on 
voter’s evaluations of the candidates, I look at the 2000 presidential election.  I focus on 
this election for two reasons.  First, the 2000 election provides an instance of strategic 
attempts by both candidates to attract Latino voters (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003).  These 
attempts were unprecedented.  Thus, the 2000 election is a unique opportunity to explore 
the use of social group cues on a group that is persuadable in that they are less tied to 
party as other social groups.   
Second, the 2000 election has some advantages in terms of data.  In order to 
explore the effect of candidate strategy on voter’s evaluations of the candidates, I need 
campaign advertising data and public opinion data.  There is great campaign advertising 
data available from the Wisconsin Advertising Project.  This dataset contains all of the 
aids aired in the top 100 media markets during the 2000 election.  The appropriate level 
of analysis when studying campaign advertising is the media market rather than the 
state.  This is because campaigns buy advertising by the media market the air is going to 
be aired in. Since the dataset features storyboards of each ad, the dataset allows for an 
analysis of what is said in the ad and what is seen in the ad.  This data is ideal for 
looking at social identity cues because I can analyze the images in the ads as well as 
phrases or words that evoke the in-group. There were almost 250,000 ads aired between 
December 1999 and mid-January 2001.  Because I am only interested in the ads that are 
likely to provide social identity cues, I only include those ads from the candidate or the 
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candidate’s party that promote the candidate.  This makes the total number of ads almost 
174,000.  Forty-two percent of ads favored Gore and 58% percent favored Bush.  
In regards to good public opinion data to measure individual level data on 
demographics and candidate evaluations, there is rolling cross-sectional data available 
from the Annenberg National Election Studies for the 2000 election.12  Rolling cross-
sectional survey data is better than other data sources such as the National Election 
Studies (NES).  This is because I have data throughout the campaign that allows for the 
exploration of the dynamics of the campaign.  Moreover, because the Annenberg data 
starts in December before the election, I am able to incorporate not only the general 
election but the earlier stages of the campaign as well.  This is extremely important 
because by the time the general election occurs, evaluations of the candidate and voter 
preferences are already formed and are difficult to change (Bartels 1993; Kern 1989).  
To explore the effects of campaign strategy, I need to look at a time when candidate 
evaluations still vary.  Furthermore, the primary season is when the candidates 
themselves are still trying to figure out the best strategy: which issues to emphasize, 
which cues to use, and how to present themselves to voters (Ridout 2004).  Thus, there is 
variation not only in voter evaluations but in candidate strategies as well.  The 
Annenberg rolling cross-sectional data offers the best data for exploring the entire 
campaign and its dynamics in terms of candidate evaluation.  
 
 
                                                
12 From Romer et al. 2004.   
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Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables I use to examine the effect of candidate strategy to 
prime social identity are voters’ general evaluations of Bush and Gore.  These measures 
are the respondent’s general favorability ratings of each of the candidates.  Values range 
from 0-100, where higher values indicate higher favorability.  Gore’s average 
favorability rating is 55 and Bush’s average favorability rating is 56.  Figure 3.1 presents 
the trend over time of both candidates’ favorability ratings. 
 Figure 3.1 illustrates how the favorability of each candidate varied over the 
course of the campaign.  Bush maintained a higher favorability rating than Gore for most 
of the campaign.  Gore had higher favorability ratings than Bush during the Democratic 
primary debate in March and also in September.   
Independent Variables 
 The first group of independent variables of interest are the individual level 
demographics of the respondent, specifically the race and sex of the respondent.  The 
measures for these variables are dummy variables.  The sex measure is coded a 1 if the 
respondent is female, and a 0 otherwise.  The sample is 55% female.  To measure race, I 
include three variables, where a 1 means the respondent is white/black/Latino and a 0 
means the respondent is not.  The base categories for these variables are those 
respondents who are Asian, Native American, or responded ‘other’.  Ten percent of the 
sample is black and 8% are Latino.  The majority of the sample is white (80%).  The 
remaining 2% makes up the base category. 
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Figure 3.1: Weekly Average Favorability Ratings 
 
 
 
    
The second group of independent variables of interest are the cues provided in 
campaign advertising.  One set of measures is the number of ads aired each week that 
feature women, African-Americans, and Latino/as.  The second set of measures is the 
number of ads aired each week that have a female, black, or Latino/a speaker.  Table 3.1 
presents the percentages of ads aired by each candidate that include social identity cues. 
Gore aired more ads with female cues and Bush aired more ads with black and 
Latino/a cues.  Both candidates aired an equal amount of ads with female and Latino/a 
speakers although Gore did not have any ads with a black speaker.  This is interesting 
given that the close ties the Democratic party has to the black community.  In addition, 
scholarship notes the effort of both candidates to appeal to Latino voters, with Bush 
making more of a concerted effort.  While Bush certainly did so by featuring Latinos in 
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his ads, both candidates had the same percentage of ads in Spanish featuring at least one 
Latino/a.   
Controls 
 I control for other individual level factors that influence candidate evaluations.  
The standard individual level demographics, in addition to race and sex, are party 
identification, ideology, and education (Peterson 2005).  The party identification 
measures are coded 1 if the respondent is Republican/Democrat and 0 otherwise.  The 
base category is independents.  The ideology measure is a scale from -2 to 2, where -2 is 
very liberal and 2 is very conservative.  Education is a nine-point scale, where higher 
values mean the respondent completed more schooling (9 is graduate or professional 
degree). 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Percentage of a Candidate’s Ads with Social 
Identity Cues 
  Bush Gore 
Ads with Women 24% 28% 
Ads with Blacks 21% 11% 
Ads with Latinos 18% 9% 
Ads w/Female Speaker 2% 2% 
Ads w/Black Speaker 1% 0% 
Ads w/Latino Speaker 1% 1% 
 
 
 
 I also control for campaign events, such as the debates and party conventions, 
since they can also influence candidate evaluations.  To control for this influence, I 
include variables for these events.  The variables are coded 1 for the week the event 
happened and every week after, and a 0 for each week prior to the event.  In addition, I 
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also control for the effect of candidate B’s advertising on candidate A, and vice versa.  
Therefore, in each model, I include the other candidate’s campaign advertising, namely 
the number of ads aired each week that have social identity cues.  
Estimation 
 To examine how social identity cues in campaign advertising influence voters’ 
evaluations of candidates, I estimate four models using hierarchical linear modeling 
(HLM) or multilevel modeling.  HLM is especially suited to studying campaigns 
because candidates do not campaign the same everywhere nor is the beginning of the 
campaign the same as the end of the campaign.  HLM recognizes that individuals are 
clustered within some higher level of aggregation.  For this chapter, individuals are 
clustered within the media market and week of the campaign the respondent is 
answering the survey in.   
 With HLM, I can explore the effect of individual level factors (i.e. race and sex) 
on candidate evaluations and I can examine the effect of being in a group (i.e. media 
market and time of the campaign) has on candidate evaluation as well.  Competitive 
races have more advertising; candidates advertise in places where it matters (Goldstein 
and Strach 2004; Goldstein and Freedman 2002).  Thus, a voter in one media market 
may be exposed to a different campaign than a voter in another media market—there is 
variation in campaign information across media markets. 
 Moreover, the campaign environment changes over the course of the campaign—
over time.  The campaign at the beginning of the rolling cross-sectional survey is 
different from the campaign during the conventions, which is different from one month 
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before the election.  HLM allows me to account for what point in the campaign the 
respondent is in. 
 Thus, HLM allows for the examination of both individual level factors like race 
and sex and upper level factors like campaign advertising.  With HLM, I can examine 
the influence that being in a certain market at a certain time of the campaign has on 
candidate evaluation.  However, HLM is not much different from regression (Gelman 
and Hill 2007).  Rather than including all of the explanatory variables at one level (i.e. 
the individual level), HLM accounts for the fact that individuals are clustered within 
groups.  Being in these groups influences the effect of the individual level variables on 
the dependent variable.  This model specification allows me to determine how social 
identity cues in campaign advertising influence voters’ evaluations of candidates. 
Models 
The first set of models are models of Bush and Gore favorability with the 
individual demographic variables, campaign advertising variables, and campaign event 
controls.  Also included is an interaction term to determine if an in-group respondent 
responds differently to ads with the respective social identity cue than someone who is 
not in the in-group.  Table 3.2 presents the results of the models with the ads that use a 
simple cue—the presence of an in-group member in the ad.  Table 3.3 presents the 
results of the models with the ads where the social identity cue is an in-group member 
speaking in the ad. 
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Table 3.2: The Effect of Social Identity Cues (Presence of a Social Group Member) 
on Candidate Favorability Ratings 
 Note: Dependent variable is favorability rating of the candidate (0-100), * p<.10. 
 
Parameter Std. Error Parameter Std. Error
Fixed Effects
Constant  56.52* 0.91 49.40* 0.91
Individual Level
Female -0.90* 0.42 3.71* 0.42
White 0.81 0.69 -2.33* 0.70
Black -7.65* 0.93 8.46* 0.94
Latino 4.98* 0.79 6.92* 0.81
Republican 18.46* 0.47 -15.32* 0.47
Democrat -12.70* 0.44 16.89* 0.44
Ideology 6.66* 0.21 -6.55* 0.21
Education -0.32* 0.08 0.27* 0.08
Upper Level
Bush Ads
Ads w/Women -0.09 0.93 -0.24 0.89
Female*Ads w/Women -0.15 0.90 -0.39 0.90
Ads w/Blacks 0.73 0.58 -0.03 0.55
Black*Ads w/Blacks -1.56 1.25 -1.02 1.26
Ads w/Latinos -0.48 0.81 0.51 0.77
Latino*Ads w/Latinos 1.49 1.71 -0.08 1.72
Gore Ads
Ads w/Women -1.49* 0.90 0.61 0.87
Female*Ads w/Women -0.77 0.80 0.26 0.81
Ads w/Blacks 1.83 1.45 -1.06 1.39
Black*Ads w/Blacks -4.51 3.49 8.36* 3.43
Ads w/Latinos 1.37 1.21 -1.79 1.15
Latino*Ads w/Latinos -0.86 2.46 0.09 2.46
Campaign Events
RNC 2.24* 0.88 1.23 0.84
DNC -2.85* 0.91 4.03* 0.86
Debate 1 0.66 1.22 -0.39 1.15
Debate 2 1.26 1.53 -3.35* 1.44
Debate 3 -1.63* 1.18 1.05 1.10
Variance Components std. dev std. dev
Individual Level 695.38 26.37 706.97 26.59
Upper Level 10.93 3.31 4.75 2.18
-2 X Log Likelihood 
N 
Number of Groups 
Bush Gore
202664 202713
21571 21556
2741 2743
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Table 3.3: The Effect of Social Identity Cues (Speaker is a Social Group Member) 
on Candidate Favorability Ratings 
Note: Dependent variable is favorability rating of the candidate (0-100), * p<.10. 
 
 
Parameter Std. Error Parameter Std. Error
Fixed Effects
Constant  56.64* 0.90 49.31* 0.90
Individual Level
Female -1.06* 0.37 3.72* 0.38
White 0.75 0.69 -2.34* 0.70
Black -8.19* 0.90 8.69* 0.90
Latino 5.00* 0.76 6.94* 0.77
Republican 18.43* 0.47 -15.31* 0.47
Democrat -12.72* 0.44 16.88* 0.44
Ideology 6.66* 0.21 -6.54* 0.21
Education -0.32* 0.08 0.27* 0.08
Upper Level
Bush Ads
Ads w/Female Speaker -1.04 15.29 -6.74 14.68
Female*Fem. Spkr. Ad -2.32 3.97 0.38 3.98
Ads w/Black Speaker -2.39 15.22 6.96 14.62
Black*Black Spkr. Ad -4.66 7.81 6.98 7.82
Ads w/Latino Speaker -6.88 4.51 2.60 4.36
Latino*Lat. Spkr. Ad 8.83* 4.89 0.11 4.97
Gore Ads
Ads w/Female Speaker -3.62 2.72 2.66 2.68
Female*Fem. Spkr. Ad -1.70 3.39 -2.13 3.43
Ads w/Latino Speaker 4.53* 2.54 2.60 4.36
Latino*Lat. Spkr. Ad -4.52 4.47 -1.46 4.50
Campaign Events
RNC 2.27* 0.88 1.19 0.83
DNC -2.98* 0.90 4.06* 0.85
Debate 1 0.41 0.35 -0.77 1.09
Debate 2 1.43 0.93 -3.02* 1.44
Debate 3 -1.33 1.14 1.15 1.09
Variance Components std. dev std. dev
Individual Level 695.46 26.37 707.21 26.59
Upper Level 10.68 3.27 4.60 2.14
-2 X Log Likelihood 
N 
Number of Groups 
Bush Gore
202662 202719
21571 21556
2741 2743
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Results 
 As shown in both tables, individual factors have the greatest influence on 
favorability ratings of both Bush and Gore.  Not surprisingly, Republicans rate Bush 
more favorability and Gore less favorably.  Democrats rate Gore more favorably and 
Bush less favorably.  The same relationship exists for ideology.  Those with more 
education rate Gore more favorably and Bush less favorably. There is no significant 
difference between the favorability ratings of white and non-white respondents for Bush 
but there is a significant difference for Gore.  White respondents rate Gore less favorably 
than non-white respondents do.   
 Campaign events also have a significant influence on favorability ratings.  For 
Bush, the most important (i.e. statistically significant) events are the conventions.  The 
Republican National Convention had a positive impact on Bush’s favorability ratings 
and the Democratic National Convention had a negative effect on his ratings.  Gore 
benefited from the Democratic National Convention and suffered from the second 
debate.  The next sections discuss the effect of social identity and social identity cues in 
ads on the candidate’s favorability ratings. 
Women 
As shown in both tables, women significantly rate Bush less favorably than men, 
and rate Gore more favorably than men do. The difference between men and women is 
greater for Gore than Bush (a three point difference for Gore and a one point difference 
for Bush).  This is in agreement with the literature.  In regards to the ads where the cue is 
the presence of a woman in an ad, Bush’s ads do not have a significant influence on his 
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favorability ratings.  Gore’s ads do not have a significant influence on his favorability 
ratings either.  However, they do have a significant and negative effect on Bush’s 
favorability ratings.  For the ads where the cue is a woman speaking in the ad, none of 
the ads have a significant effect on either candidate’s favorability ratings. 
 The interaction terms allow me to determine if ads with social identity cues 
aimed at women were effective in increasing women’s favorability ratings of the 
candidates.  A significant interaction term tells me that the effect of the ads on 
favorability is different for men and women.  The interaction terms are not significant 
which means that there is not a significant difference between men and women in the 
effect of the ads with female social identity cues on candidate evaluations.  For women, 
it seems, social identity cues were not effective. 
 One explanation is that other identities may be more important than one’s gender.  
For example, race trumps gender (Mansbridge and Tate 1992; Gay and Tate 1998).  
Moreover, women as a social group are not as cohesive as other social groups. One 
cleavage has to do with marital status.  Research has shown a ‘marriage gap’ among 
women; there are differences in the political behavior and attitudes of women who are 
married and those who are not (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, and Lin 2004). Due to 
these reasons, social identity cues may not work as well for women as they may for other 
social groups.   
African-Americans 
 According to both tables, unsurprisingly, African-Americans significantly rate 
Bush lower than non-blacks and significantly rate Gore higher.  The difference is about 
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the same (-8 points for Bush and 8 points for Gore).  This is in agreement with the 
literature.  Ads where the cue is an African-American in the ad do not have a significant 
effect on either candidate’s favorability ratings.  The same null findings apply to the ads 
where the cue is an African-American speaking in the ad.   
 The interaction term is not significant except in one case.  The interaction of 
African-American and Gore’s ads, where the cue is the presence of an African-
American, has a significant and positive effect on Gore’s favorability ratings.  This 
means that the effect of black social identity cues in Gore’s advertising on his 
favorability ratings is different for blacks than non-blacks.  Gore ads featuring African-
Americans appear to trigger social identity among African-Americans, leading to in-
group favoritism.  These results would likely be similar (and perhaps larger) if Gore had 
ads where the cue is an African-American speaker.  The results for African-Americans 
are not surprising; they conform to the literature on black political identification and 
voting behavior. 
Latinos 
 The results regarding Latinos is probably the most interesting since there are 
more appeals on both sides to Latino/a voters and the likelihood that such appeals may 
be successful in persuading Latino/a voters.  Latinos rate each candidate more favorably 
than non-Latino respondents, although they rate Gore slightly higher than Bush.  Ads 
that simply featured a Latino/a did not have an effect on either candidate’s favorability 
rating.  However, the ads that featured a Latino/a speaker (usually in Spanish) benefited 
effect on Bush’s ratings, even though these ads were not Bush’s ads but Gore’s.  Gore’s 
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ads featuring a Latino speaker had a significant and positive effect on Bush’s ratings.  
The effect of Bush’s ads featuring a Latino speaker on his ratings was significantly 
different for Latinos and non-Latinos.   
 I believe the reason for the results is language.  Although both candidates aired 
equal percentages of their campaign ads in Spanish (around 2%), a greater percentage of 
Bush’s ads aimed at Latinos were in Spanish than Gore’s ads.  Twenty percent of Bush’s 
ads aimed at Latinos were in Spanish compared to 10% of Gore’s ads.  It is probable that 
Gore’s ads helped Bush in that they illustrated to Latinos that Bush was more like them 
than Gore because Gore’s ads did not literally speak to them.   
 Also interesting in these findings is that the candidates were not hurt by their 
appeals to Latino voters.  Research on priming racial attitudes (about blacks) finds that 
activating racial attitudes has negative consequences for the candidates (Mendelberg 
2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002).  It seems that it is not the case for 
Latinos.  Indeed, this is somewhat surprising given a seemingly increasing resentment 
towards Latinos and especially immigrants of Hispanic ethnicity.     
  
Discussion 
This chapter explored the use of social identity cues by candidates and their 
effect on social group members’ evaluations of the candidates.  This chapter finds that 
appeals to women do not result in significant differences between men and women’s 
candidate evaluations, although appeals to women by one candidate (Gore) can decrease 
the other candidate’s ratings (Bush).  Appeals to African-Americans were only effective 
 48 
for Gore; the effect of ads with black social identity cues significantly influences blacks’ 
ratings of Gore.  Appeals to Latinos were only successful for Bush and Gore’s appeals 
helped Bush as well.   
The results demonstrate two things.  First, candidates do use social identity cues 
in their campaign advertising.  Strategically, Latinos offer the candidates the chance to 
gain the support of a constituency that is increasing in population and is ‘shopping 
around’ for a new party (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003).  By providing a more effective cue, 
which in this case is a Latino Spanish speaker, Bush was able to persuade Latinos that he 
was like them.  
However, these findings are not particularly conclusive.  In order to understand 
how candidates strategically use social identity and how it affects voters, a better 
medium to focus on may be direct mail.  With direct mail, it is easier to tailor messages 
to individual voters (Hillygus and Shields 2008).  Direct mail offers candidates a way to 
really show voters the candidate is like them. 
Nevertheless, social identity theory provides a way for researchers to examine 
how campaigns affect voters, by examining how candidates strategically provide cues to 
take advantage of in-group favoritism.  Moreover, research on campaigns also benefits 
social identity theory by allowing researchers to address the intersectionality of identity.  
Specifically, people have many social identities.  The key to understanding social 
identity is to discover which identities are more important and why.  Studying 
campaigns and social identity together provides researchers with a way to explore the 
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complex relationships between social identity, political attitudes, and politics more 
generally.   
Secondly, this study demonstrates that we need to expand how we study 
campaigns.  Much can be gained from examining additional ways in which the campaign 
affects voters. Campaign research predominantly focuses on general behavior such as 
how campaigns affect turnout or political knowledge.  We miss an important piece of the 
story about how campaigns affect voting behavior when we study campaigns in this 
way. If we want to understand the effect of campaigns on voters, we cannot treat 
campaigns as if they exist outside of the political world in which they were created.  We 
need to consider that there are strategic choices behind a campaign that have an impact 
on voters and that these strategies are not just about increasing turnout or political 
knowledge.  They are about affecting how voters see the candidates, the electoral 
process, and politics.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EFFECT OF UPPER AND MIDDLE LEVEL MANAGERS AND THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP ON ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
 
Overview 
Research on public management presents an incomplete picture about the 
relationship between management and performance because only one level of 
management is studied at a time.  Organizations have more than one level of 
management and in considering this, we can learn more about how management matters.  
This chapter looks at both the effect of not just middle and upper level managers on 
performance, but how their interactions with each other have an impact as well.  This 
chapter creates a measure of middle manager quality and uses that measure to determine 
the effect of middle management on performance.  This measure is then used to explore 
how management at the top and middle of an organization interact to affect performance.  
Results show middle management has a significant influence on performance and that 
upper and middle level management interact to influence performance.  The conclusion 
of the chapter is that current research underestimates the impact of management and that 
the study of middle management offers a way to complete our understanding of how 
management matters for organizational performance.   
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Introduction 
The goal of public management scholars is to determine how management affects 
public organizations. A rich body of empirical research on the impact of top managers 
on organizational performance has shown that management matters by introducing a 
large n dataset to the study of public management (O’Toole and Meier 1999; Meier and 
O’Toole 2002). Another body of public management literature focuses on how public 
managers affect performance (Riccucci 1996, 2005; Lynn 1996).  This literature 
provides a theory of public management generated from ‘best practices’ research (i.e. 
case studies) as well as organization theory and traditional public administration.  This 
body of work focuses largely on the career civil servant—the middle manager—and how 
she can affect an organization. 
However, both of these bodies of public management research—how public 
managers manage and if public managers affect organizational performance—when 
considered together form an incomplete picture of the relationship between management 
and performance. The incomplete picture occurs because on the one hand, the case study 
literature tells us how public managers—namely middle managers—matter to an 
organization without empirically demonstrating that middle management matters.  Thus, 
we believe middle managers to matter, but we do not have empirical evidence to support 
this belief.  On the other hand, research that does empirically determine the impact of 
management only focuses on management at the top of an organization.  This is 
especially troublesome given that organizations have more than one level of 
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management (Mintzberg 1979). Thus, the picture is incomplete because we do not know 
about the impact of management at levels other than the top.  
However, more is needed to complete the picture than just determining the 
impact of various managerial levels on an organization.  Although management at each 
level can directly affect the organization, the levels of management should also influence 
each other and in the process have a further influence on performance (Riccucci 2005).  
In order to complete the picture about management, therefore, we need to consider how 
managers influence managers at other levels and how their relationships with one 
another influence the organization and its performance.     
Because scholars have examined only the direct impact of management at one 
level on performance without considering middle management or how the combined 
effects of multiple management levels matter, scholars maybe underestimating the 
impact of management.  This chapter adds to what we know about public management 
by seeking answers to two questions.  One, what effects do middle managers have on 
organizational performance?  Second, how does the relationship between upper and 
middle managers interact to affect organizational performance?  
 
Middle Managers: Who They Are and Why They Matter 
When we consider an organization, there are two main parts.  The first part is the 
operating core.  Those in the operating core are front line workers or street level 
bureaucrats.  Their job is to carry out the basic work of the organization; they produce 
the services and products of the organization.  The second part is management and in 
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most organizations, there is more than level of management (Mintzberg 1979). Upper-
level managers are at the very top of an organization, the strategic apex (Mintzberg 
1979).  Those in the strategic apex are responsible for ensuring that the organization 
serves its purpose effectively and that it serves the needs of those who control or have 
power over the organization (Mintzberg 1979).  
Middle managers are different from top managers in two ways. They are unique 
because of their location in the organization.  Middle managers belong to the worker 
level and to the managerial level (Barnard 1938); they are both executives and front line 
workers. Middle managers are the connection between upper level managers and street 
level bureaucrats; they inform both levels about what the other level is doing (Lynn, 
Heinrich, and Hill 2001; Mintzberg 1979; Lipsky 1980).  Specifically, they collect 
feedback on their unit’s performance and pass this information to upper management, 
and they communicate the directives of upper management to front line workers.  They 
are the primary means of communication within the organization, which is an integral 
and important part of an organization (Mintzberg 1979).   
The second way middle managers differ is due to their role in the implementation 
of policy.  Although middle managers work below a policy making level (which occurs 
at the strategic apex), they are largely responsible for how policy is implemented.   
Those at the top of the organization pass down directives, and middle managers decide 
how those directives are best achieved.  They are responsible for getting what top 
management wants done and do so by implementing and communicating the policies, 
missions, and goals of the organization (Rainey and Watson 1996; Lumsden 1982). Due 
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to the input they have in the implementation of policy, middle managers can have a large 
impact on the organization and its outputs.    
In the implementation of policy and organizational goals, middle managers 
perform the roles of those in the strategic apex but in the context of their own unit 
(Mintzberg 1979). According to the case study literature, middle managers are the direct 
supervisors of the workers in their unit and are responsible for the hiring, evaluation, and 
improvement of those workers.  They allocate resources; create budgets, schedules and 
reports; and set rules and guidelines for those below them in the organization.  They 
build networks with those higher up in the organization and with other middle managers. 
They are responsible for creating a sense of teamwork within the unit and for motivating 
employees (Rainey and Watson 1996; Rainey 2003). Middle managers are held 
accountable for the performance of their unit, and how well middle managers handle 
these tasks affects organizational performance (Hayes 2004). 
In addition to their direct impact on the organization, middle managers indirectly 
affect the organization by influencing top-level managers, whom the literature tells us 
have a positive and significant effect on organizational performance (O’Toole and Meier 
1999; Meier and O’Toole 2002). By this, I mean that the actions taken at one level are 
going to affect the actions of all of the other levels of an organization (Riccucci 2005).  
Understanding how the levels of an organization interact with one another allows us to 
understand more generally how management as a whole works (Kettl 1990).  This is 
because management matters depending not only on the level you are at in the 
bureaucracy (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001; Riccucci 2005) but because each level of 
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management does not exist independently of the rest of the organization.  Indeed, an 
organization is more than the sum of its parts (Smith 1776).  By coordinating with each 
other, managers at each level affect the organization more together than they do 
separately. An examination of the direct impact of upper and middle management on 
performance is not enough; we need to consider how the relationship between top and 
middle managers matters as well if we are to understand how management matters.   
Hypotheses 
Up to this point, I have defined who middle managers are and what their role is 
in an organization.  I have also made a case for why it is important to look at more than 
one level of management and at the interaction of these levels.  The goal of this chapter 
is to better understand how management matters to an organization.  By focusing on 
middle managers, we can better understand the impact of management as a whole 
because we gain two new insights—about management at a different level and how the 
relationship between management at the top and the middle affects the organization.  
The first insight is an empirical determination of the impact of middle managers 
on an organization.  The case study literature tells us that what middle managers do is 
important to an organization, and the large n dataset literature tells us that management 
(at the top) matters.  Based on this, middle managers, due to the tasks they perform, 
matter to an organization.  Thus, my first hypothesis posits that as the quality of the 
middle manager increases, so too will performance.  Specifically, 
H1: Better middle managers will have a positive impact on an organization. 
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 The second insight is how managerial levels interact to affect performance.  
There are two possible scenarios.  The first scenario is that top and middle managers 
complement each other’s efforts.  The result being that management as a whole has an 
even greater impact on performance than if we just looked at the direct effects of each 
management level. The reasoning behind this is that quality managers will work together 
to improve performance and by doing so their impact on performance will be greater 
than if they did not work together.  The complementing hypothesis proposes that: 
 H2a: The effect of management on performance is greater and positive when 
both levels of management are good. 
In other words, the impact of management will be greater when both managers are of 
high quality. 
 The second scenario is that good management at one level will compensate for 
poor management at the other level.  For example, when one level of management is not 
very good, the other level of management steps in to ensure that the organization is not 
too adversely affected. The compensating hypothesis posits that: 
 H2b: Good management at one level will compensate for poor management at 
the other level so that performance is not negatively affected.    
The reasoning behind this is that a good manager will recognize that there are things that 
are not being done that need to be and will take action.  Regardless of the scenario, 
exploring the relationship between managerial levels will reveal how management 
works.  The methods used to test these hypotheses are presented next. 
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Data and Methods 
 To test these hypotheses, I have three data requirements.  The first requirement is 
a measure of middle management.  Moreover, I need a measure of middle management 
that can be compared to a measure of upper level management for the same 
organizations. The second requirement is consistent performance measures for those 
same organizations.  The last requirement is these measures over time so that I can 
establish causality between management and performance.   
Data 
 Given these data needs, I use a dataset of the most common public organization 
in the United States—school districts. Specifically, the dataset includes information on 
more than 1,000 school districts in Texas.  School districts are independent local 
governments with their own taxing powers, are highly professionalized with certification 
processes for various occupations, and are fairly decentralized; there is discretion at each 
level of the organization, with the most discretion at the street-level.  Due the size of 
Texas, there is diversity in the location (urban, suburban, and rural), size, race, and class 
of the school districts.  There is variation in this diversity as well.  Some school districts 
are homogenous in terms of race and class and other are extremely heterogeneous.   
This dataset provides me with the necessary measures to test my hypotheses.  
First, the dataset provides information about district managers so that comparable 
measures of top and middle managers can be created.  Second, the advantage to using 
Texas public school data is the availability of performance measures that are comparable 
across institutions and that are meaningful to the organization and to the community it 
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serves.  The main performance measure is student scores on the state standardized test, 
the TAAS until 2002 and the TAKS starting in 2003.  Lastly, the time period of the 
dataset is from 2000 through 2005, which provides me with multiple time points.   
The unit of analysis is the school district.  The structure of the school district is 
hierarchical with a superintendent at the top of the organization, principals in the middle, 
and teachers serving as street level bureaucrats.  In order to test the hypotheses the whole 
organization must be considered since one of the hypotheses focuses on the managerial 
levels within an organization.  Performance measures, organizational characteristics 
(size, location, resources, etc.), and managerial and worker data (i.e. superintendents, 
principals and teachers) are provided at the district level by the Texas Education Agency 
(TEA).    
Middle Manager Quality 
To test these hypotheses, we need to create a measure of middle management.  In 
school districts, principals are middle managers (Hayes 2004).  The tasks they perform 
are the tasks of management, and they reside in the middle of the school district 
organization, between the superintendent and teachers.  They have to consult with the 
rest of the district team (i.e. teachers, staff, and upper levels of management) as well as 
the community, parents, and students when making administrative decisions regarding 
budgets, schedules, and the implementation of new policies.  They are responsible for 
hiring, evaluating, and developing parallel staff.  Principals also issue school status 
reports that district administrators and the community care about.  Principals are 
responsible for student academic performance in ensuring that teachers are following the 
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appropriate curriculum.  They set the academic tone of the school by setting expectations 
and standards and by organizing the school around school achievement (i.e. goal setting 
and motivating employees) (Hayes 2004; Smith and Andrews 1989; Sergiovanni 2001).  
Principals, because of the tasks they perform and because they bridge those at the top of 
the district (superintendents) with those at the lower level of the district (teachers), are 
middle managers. 
 Any measure of middle management, to test these hypotheses, needs to allow for 
the identification of good and bad middle management —a measure of managerial 
quality. What we know about managerial quality usually comes from anecdotal evidence 
and case studies, and this research usually links managerial quality with leadership 
(Riccucci 1996; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Beam 2001).  To create a quantifiable 
measure of management quality, we can use salary as a proxy for quality.  The 
assumption behind this approach is that better principals will have higher salaries.   
Such a measure of managerial quality relies on the idea that the market drives 
principal salaries; districts will pay more for quality principals in an effort to attract and 
reward talented managers.  Indeed, there are no pre-negotiated or base salaries for 
principals.  Although not all principals may participate in the market (i.e. they may just 
accept what other principals in the district are getting), what is important is that at the 
margins there is a market for principals.  Marginal consumers (i.e. those districts or 
schools that gather information and seek out quality principals) can drive the market.  
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Moreover, those in charge of setting principal salaries are upper level managers.13  This 
means that professionals—those who know the worth of a quality principal—are the 
ones who set salaries.  Thus, those districts that wish to attract quality middle managers 
and are able to identify them should generate a market that keeps the salary of all middle 
managers competitive (Schneider, Teske, and Marschall 2000). The average principal 
salary is $58,469 with a standard deviation of $8,230. 
 There are two steps to creating a measure of middle manager quality.  The first 
step is to predict a district’s average principal salary.  This variable has been logged to 
account for extreme values.  There are multiple factors that affect salary such as the 
wealth of a district or if a principal has an advanced degree.  The second step is to take 
the residuals of the model and standardize them.  The idea behind this method is that 
what is left (i.e. what is not explained by these factors) is principal quality.  For example, 
a principal with the reputation of turning schools around will be paid more because 
districts with poor schools will try to attract the principal to turn their school around.  
The part of the principal’s salary that is above and beyond what similarly qualified 
principals would make is the factor responsible for turning schools around; this is 
quality.  The standardized residuals of the model predicting average principal salary is 
the measure of middle manager quality.   
                                                
13 The principal hiring process starts with the school board and the superintendent, who get together to 
determine their ideal candidate.  They may also form a search committee to advertise the job opening, 
review applications, select candidates to interview, and interview candidates.  When there is not a search 
committee, central administration performs these tasks.  Finalists, determined from the first round of 
interviews, visit the district and meet with administrators, teachers, and sometimes the school board.  The 
school board, based on the recommendation of the superintendent, makes the final decision.  The 
superintendent meets with the successful candidate to discuss the job and salary.  In states without 
contracts and unions, such as Texas, individual negotiations occur (Hayes 2004).  This process occurs 
even if the candidate is from another school in the district. 
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Step 1: Predicting Average Principal Salary   
To create a middle manager quality measure, it is necessary to identify the 
factors that influence a principal’s salary.  According to a common salary model from 
the literature, these factors fall into four categories—district characteristics, human 
capital factors, personal characteristics, and past performance (Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, 
and Ehrenberg 1988a,b).  The first category comprises district characteristics, namely 
district resources.  The measures for these factors are the district’s total expenditures, the 
tax rate, and the average revenue per student, all of which are logged.  All things being 
equal, we would expect districts with more resources to pay higher salaries.   
The second set of factors are human capital factors such as principals’ education 
and experience.  These measures may be problematic for predicting principal salary 
because we cannot include individual level measures of experience, education, and 
training since there are multiple principals in a district.  Therefore, the human capital 
factor measures will have to be averages of these factors, specifically, average principal 
experience, average principal degree and average principal age.  We would expect 
districts to pay higher salaries for more experienced principals and those with more 
education.   
The same problem exists for the third set of factors—personal characteristics.  
Personal characteristics are things such as race and gender. Unlike the human capital 
factors, having an average, percentage, or ratio measure of race or gender may not be 
particularly useful for predicting a district’s average principal salary.  Nevertheless, 
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including a percent female and percent white variable may account for the effect of 
personal characteristics on average principal salary.   
Minority principals may have a higher salary because of a district’s desire to 
increase diversity and hire quality minority principals.  Minority principals may then 
increase the average principal salary in a district. Female principals may make either 
more or less money.  In order to be a principal, one must have spent time in the 
classroom.  Female principals may make less money because there are more women in 
the ranks to choose from since women comprise a large majority of teachers.  On the 
other hand, women are less likely to move into administrative positions and so districts 
may pay more for female principals because they are scarce.    
The fourth factor is the relationship between salary and performance.  Better 
performing districts reward principals and quality principals are more likely to be in 
better performing districts. My past performance measure on the TAAS/TAKS has been 
purged via an instrumental variables technique to eliminate any reciprocal influence 
between past performance and managerial quality.14  Table 4.1 presents the results of the 
model predicting logged average principal salary.   
The model accounts for 51% of the variability in average principal salary.  The 
resources of the district have the largest influence on principal salary, and the 
relationship is in the expected positive direction.  The human capital measures are all 
significant and in the expected direction.  In regards to personal characteristics, race and 
sex are not significant predictors of principal salary.  Although the relationships revealed 
                                                
14 The instrumental variables are the district’s previous year’s performance on the TAAS/TAKS, revenue 
per pupil, and the percent of black, Latino, and low-income students in the district.   
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in Table 4.1 are interesting, they are not the focus of this study.  The purpose of this part 
of the analysis is to remove as many non-quality factors from the principal’s salary as 
possible and to take what is not explained by salary determinants as an indicator of 
quality. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1: Predicting Average Principal Salary 
Note: Dependent variable is the logged average principal salary.   
Coefficients for individual years not reported. 
 
 
 
Step 2: Standardize the Residuals 
The middle manager quality measure is the standardized residuals from the 
model presented in Table 4.1.  The residuals are centered on the mean of the residuals.  
A value of 0 means a district has average middle manager quality.  Values range from -3 
Coef. t-score
District Characteristics
Logged Total Expenditures 0.06 44.45
Logged Tax Rate 0.05 3.23
Logged Revenue/pupil 0.04 5.82
Personal Characteristics
Avg. Degree 0.04 7.44
Avg. Experience 0.003 11.35
Avg. Age 0.00003 4.69
Percent Female 0.00008 1.57
Percent White -0.00003 -0.45
Purged Past Performance 0.02 10.07
Adj. R-squared 0.51
Root  MSE 0.09
F 390.82
N 4874
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to 3 where -3 is very low quality and 3 is very high quality. In districts where middle 
manager quality is 1 (i.e. a 1 standard deviation change from 0), the average principal 
salary is around $3,000 more than in those districts where middle manager quality is 
average (i.e. a value of 0).  This measure allows for the testing of the first hypothesis 
about the effect of middle managers on organizational performance.  To test hypothesis 
2, we need a measure of upper level management that is comparable to the measure of 
middle manager quality.    
Upper Management Quality 
The measure of upper level management is also a measure of quality.  As with 
principals, better superintendents are rewarded in a competitive labor market with higher 
salaries. The measure of superintendent quality is created by first predicting 
superintendent salaries with variables that measure district financial resources, past 
performance, and the personal and professional characteristics of superintendents.  
Values of superintendent quality range from -5 to 5, where positive values mean above 
average superintendent quality.  The measure has been validated in research on the effect 
of superintendents on performance (Meier and O’Toole 2002).   
Since both measures are standardized, they are on the same scale and therefore 
are comparable.  To test the hypotheses about the relationship between upper and middle 
management, the measures also need to be distinct.   It is possible that the middle and 
top managerial quality measures are not distinct but rather the result of a salary pattern 
where districts that pay more/less for superintendents pay more/less for principals.  If 
this were the case, the two measures would be correlated.  They are not.  The correlation 
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between the two quality measures is 0.09.  Now that we have measures of middle and 
top manager quality, we can proceed in testing the hypotheses about how middle 
managers and the relationship between middle and top-level managers affects 
performance. 
Performance 
There are many ways to evaluate school district performance.  In Texas, the most 
important and salient performance measure is student performance on the Texas 
Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS).15 The federal ‘No Child Left Behind’ policy is 
based on Texas’ experience with this test.  It is a basic skills test designed to measure 
student success and teacher effectiveness.  All students in grades 3-8 and 10 must take 
the test.  Students in tenth grade must pass the test in order to graduate from high school. 
These test scores are used to rank districts and are widely reported in the news media; 
the TAAS/TAKS is the most visible indicator of school performance and the quality of 
schools.  This performance measure is the percentage of students in a district who pass 
all (reading, writing, and math) sections of the TAAS/TAKS.  The mean of this measure 
is 76 with a standard deviation of 14.     
 Although the standardized test is important, there are other tasks on which 
managers place importance.  In addition to teaching students basic skills, schools are 
responsible for preparing students for higher education. The standardized test measures 
basic skills, but schools also care about more advanced skills that students can use in 
college.  The TEA defines students as college ready if they score at or above 1110 on the 
                                                
15 This test was the TAAS until 2002 and then the name changed to the TAKS starting in 2003. 
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SAT or its ACT equivalent. 16  A score of 1110 on the SAT (or its ACT equivalent) 
would rank in the top 20% nationwide and is usually sufficient to get into a quality 
college.  The college ready performance measure is the percentage of students who took 
the test that scored at or above 1110 on the SAT (or its ACT equivalent).  The mean of 
this measure is 21 and the standard deviation is 12.  
On a more basic level, before students can be taught basic or more advanced 
skills, they must be in the classroom. Thus, a very simple and yet important task of 
managers is student attendance.  This measure is the district’s average daily attendance.  
The mean of this measure is 96 with a standard deviation of 0.85. 
Control Variables  
More than just management influences school performance.  According to 
education research on school performance, resources matter—schools with more 
resources perform better (Wenglinsky 1997; Hanushek 1996; Hedges and Greenwald 
1996).  Resources are also important because they can make the manager’s job easier; 
resources enable the manager to address problems and implement and fund needed 
programs.  Monetary resources are measured with average teacher salary and the amount 
of state aid the district receives.  Human resources are measured with a district’s average 
years of teacher experience and the percentage of teachers with an advanced degree.  
The degree of difficulty of the manager’s job is also related to school 
performance.  Difficulty is defined here in terms of resources and the heterogeneity of 
                                                
16 The SAT and ACT are standardized tests designed to measure critical thinking skills.  Colleges and 
universities use the SAT or ACT, in addition to a student’s high school record, to determine success in 
college.  The SAT is more popular among colleges on the west and east coasts and the ACT is more 
popular in the Midwest and the South.  
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the district.  Homogenous districts are less difficult to manage than heterogeneous 
districts.  For example, a homogenous district with a wealthy student body (i.e. the 
students are all the same class and race) is likely to have high performance no matter 
what management does (Burtless 1996).  A district with a poor and a highly diverse 
student body will have greater difficulty in attaining high performance scores because 
the schools will have to make up for a less supportive home environment and deal with a 
more varied and complex learning environment (Jencks and Phillips 1998).  The three 
measures that control for task difficulty are the percent of black, Latino, and low-income 
students in a district.  These variables measure task difficulty because they reflect the 
homogeneity or heterogeneity of a district.  Thus, all three task difficulty measures will 
have a negative influence on performance. 
In addition to controlling for resources and task difficulty, the size of the district 
also matters.  This is measured with the logged total enrollment of students in a district 
and the average class size.  The model also controls for past performance with a lagged 
dependent variable and dummy variables for individual years although the coefficients 
for the individual year dummy variables are not reported.17    
  
Results 
The two hypotheses presented in this chapter focus on what effect middle 
managers and the interaction between top and middle managers have on organizational 
performance.  The first hypothesis is tested with the model presented above.  The second 
                                                
17 I also ran a two-way fixed effects model.  The results are similar. 
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hypothesis is tested with the same model but with the inclusion of an interaction term, 
where superintendent quality is interacted with principal quality.  
Hypothesis 1: The Effect of Middle Manager Quality on Performance 
To determine the effect of middle manager quality on organizational 
performance, the standardized residual measure from the model presented in Table 4.1 is 
included in a model predicting performance.  Table 4.2 presents the results of the models 
predicting performance on the TAAS/TAKS, the percent of college ready students, and 
attendance rates.18  According to Table  4.2, middle manager quality exerts a positive 
and significant influence on two of the three performance measures.   
Standardized Tests 
The impact of middle management quality is positive and significant for 
TAAS/TAKS pass rates.  Substantively, this means a one standard deviation change in 
middle manager quality increases performance on the TAAS/TAKS the next year by 
1.04 percentage points.  Therefore, an above average middle manager increases 
performance on the standardized test by 4%.  Although this may not seem like a large 
impact, there is a distributive lag effect.  For example, let us say the district pass rate in 
the first year (year 0) is 10.  The next year (year 1), if we hold everything else constant 
except for the effect of middle management, the pass rate will be 11.04.  In the third year 
                                                
18 In examining the effect of middle manager quality, it is important to relate it to a variety of performance 
indicators.  If middle manager quality matters for more than just one or two performance measures, then 
confidence in the measure and conclusions about the importance of middle managerial quality to 
performance is justified.  Moreover, the quality of middle management may matter less or more depending 
on the task because the ability of management to solve problems may be limited.  The effects of middle 
manager and managerial quality on additional measures of performance are provided in table A.3 in the 
appendix.  The models are the same as in Table 4.2, the control variables are simply not reported. 
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(year 2), the pass rate will be 11.04 (year 1 performance) plus 1.04.  Thus, over five 
years (year 0 to year 5), a one standard deviation change in middle management quality 
increases pass rates from 10 to 15.2—a difference of 5.2 percentage points.  Moreover, if 
the middle manager gets better over time (i.e. a two standard deviation change instead of 
one), the effect of the middle manager on TAAS/TAKS performance would be even 
greater.  
 
 
 
Table 4.2: The Effect of Middle Management on Performance 
Note: Coefficients for individual years not reported. 
 
 
 
Now lets compare the effect of middle management quality on the TAAS/TAKS 
with the effect of superintendent quality.  A one standard deviation change in 
superintendent quality increases performance on the TAAS/TAKS by 0.33 percentage 
points.  Over five years, the effect of superintendent quality will be 1.65.  Compare this 
Independent Variables Coef. t-score Coef. t-score Coef. t-score
Management 
Middle Manager Quality 1.04* 3.85 2.60* 4.67 -0.01 -0.25
Superintendent Quality 0.33* 4.31 0.62* 4.07 0.01* 2.05
Control Variables
% Black Students -0.05* -6.10 -0.05* -3.18 0.001 1.41
% Latino Students -0.01* -2.75 -0.01 -1.19 0.001* 2.77
% Low Income Students -0.07* -9.42 -0.19* -12.84 -0.003* -5.74
Avg. Teacher Salary 0.57 1.38 -2.58* -3.22 0.06 1.65
Avg. Teacher Experience 0.05 1.29 0.39* 4.89 -0.002 -0.54
Teachers w/Adv. Degrees 0.001 0.15 0.05* 2.58 -0.0004 -0.57
Class Size -0.08 -1.46 -0.58* -5.00 -0.01* -2.66
State Aid -0.0006 -1.56 -0.002* -2.39 0.00005 1.45
Logged Enrollment -0.49* -2.50 0.71 1.71 -0.03 -1.60
Past Performance 0.77* 73.59 0.35* 24.40 0.81* 97.87
Adj. R-square
Root MSE
F
N 4783
0.41
4780 4324
878.77
4.92 8.94
2016.08 211.00
Stdized Test College Ready Attendance
0.87 0.44 0.75
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to the five year effect of middle management quality (5.45) and we see that middle 
manager quality has a greater (and significantly different effect (p-value<0.01)) on 
TAAS/TAKS pass rates than upper-level managers.   
In regards to the control variables, enrollment has a significant and negative 
effect on TAAS/TAKS performance; larger districts have lower pass rates.  The task 
difficulty measures also have a significant and negative influence on TAAS/TAKS 
performance.  The resource measures do not have a significant influence although much 
of the influence of resources may already be reflected in the lagged dependent variable.  
Resources do not seem to matter for performance on the TAAS/TAKS as much as 
management and the challenges managers face. 
College Readiness 
The effect of middle management quality on the percentage of college ready 
students is also significant and positive.  A one standard deviation change in middle 
manager quality increases the percentage of college ready students 14% or, by 2.60 
percentage points the next year.  This effect by itself is quite large but taken over time 
the effect is even greater.  Over five years, middle management quality can increase the 
percent of college ready students by 6.2 percentage points.  This is an increase of 30%. 
This is a big effect and this is for only a one standard deviation increase in quality.   
When comparing the effect of middle management quality (2.60) to the effect of 
managerial quality (0.62), we see that middle manager quality has a significantly greater 
effect on the percentage of college ready students than superintendent quality (p-
value<0.001).  The difference between the effect of superintendent quality and middle 
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managerial quality is even more pronounced when comparing the 5-year effects. 
Superintendent quality, over five years, can increase performance by 3.1 percentage 
points compared to the five-year effect of middle managerial quality (13 percentage 
points).     
The size of the district does not have a significant influence on the percentage of 
college ready students in a district.  All of the task difficulty measures are in the 
expected negative direction but only the black and low-income student variables are 
statistically significant.  Districts with better human and fiscal resources have a positive 
influence on the percentage of college ready students. 
Attendance 
 The effect of middle management quality on attendance rates is not significant.  
The effect of superintendent quality is significant, albeit very small.  The results for the 
control variables in this model are unlike those for the other two models.  Perhaps this is 
because, unlike academic performance, the expectations about the task difficulty 
measures (percent black, Latino, and low-income students) and attendance rates are 
unclear.  The percentage of black students in a district does not have a significant effect 
on attendance rates but the percentages of Latino and low-income populations do.  The 
low-income measure is negative, which means that as the population of low-income 
students increases, attendance rates will decrease.  The Latino student measure is 
positive, which means that as the population of Latino students increase, attendance rates 
increase.  Enrollment is significant and negative; districts with more students are likely 
 72 
to have lower attendance rates.  Human and fiscal resources do not have a significant 
influence on attendance rates.   
Summary of Hypothesis 1 Results 
The results presented in Table 4.2 demonstrate that middle managers matter for 
overall performance (TAAS/TAKS) and for high-end performance (college ready 
students).  In addition, the effects of middle management quality on these two 
performance measures are substantially larger than the effects of superintendent quality.  
It is important to note that the impact of management on performance exists above and 
beyond district resources, especially wealth.  This means that good managers (both 
middle and upper level) can overcome at least some of the resource constraints.  
However, the results also demonstrate that middle manager quality does not have an 
influence on low-end performance such as school attendance rates, but then neither do 
human and fiscal resources; the significant factor for attendance rates is task difficulty.  
The conclusions so far are three.  The first is that hypothesis 1 is supported, good 
middle managers have a positive effect on performance.  The second conclusion is that 
this effect is significantly different and larger than the effect of top managers on 
performance.  What this means then is that past research has underestimated the effect of 
management on performance.  This is the third conclusion, namely that when middle 
managers are considered, management has a much greater influence on performance 
than the literature tells us.     
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Hypothesis 2: The Interaction of Top and Middle Management 
The model to test the second hypothesis is the same as in Table 4.2, with the 
addition of an interaction term between superintendent and principal quality.  By 
examining the three performance measures, it allows us to see if there are different 
relationships between managerial levels depending on the task.  Recall that there are two 
possible relationships.  The first relationship (hypothesis 2a) is that there is a 
complementing relationship between the two managerial levels, where performance is 
even better when both levels of management are good.  The second relationship 
(hypothesis 2b) is that there is a compensating relationship, where good management at 
one level makes up for bad management at the other level.  The relevant coefficients are 
presented in Table 4.3.   
 
 
 
Table 4.3: The Interaction of Management 
Note: All equations control for all variables in Table 4.2: logged enrollment, average teacher salary, the 
percent of teachers with advanced degrees, average teacher experience, percentages of black, Latino, and 
low-income students, and the percentage of state aid a district receives, class size, past performance, and 
yearly dummies.   
 
Management Variables Coefficient t-score Coefficient t-score Coefficient t-score
Middle Manager Quality 1.03 3.83 2.67 4.80 0.01 0.48
Superintendent Quality 0.33 4.34 0.45 2.85 0.01 1.84
Middle Manager Quality X
Superintendent Quality -0.03 -0.51 0.53 3.86 0.01 2.28
Adj. R-square
F
N
Joint F-Test (Prob>F) 6.14 0.01 14.73 0.001 0.00 0.95
0.44
4783
200.01
4324
Performance Measures
TAAS/TAKS College Ready Attendance
4780
0.87
1897.21
0.75
878.31
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The coefficients and t-scores themselves do not have a substantive interpretation 
(Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).  Rather, the information from Table 4.3 is used to 
calculate the marginal effects of principal quality contingent on superintendent quality 
and vice versa.  
Standardized Tests 
Column 1 in Table 4.3 shows that, for performance on the TAAS/TAKS, the 
effect of middle manager quality for any value of superintendent quality is: 
Slope = 1.03 – 0.03 x Superintendent quality 
Using this formula, the effect of middle management quality on performance when 
superintendent quality is low (one standard deviation below the mean), average (the 
mean), and high (one standard deviation above the mean) can be calculated.  The 
marginal effects of middle manager quality depending on various levels of 
superintendent quality are presented in Table 4.4.   
The effect of middle management quality on TAAS/TAKS pass rates changes 
from 1.07 to 1.01 as superintendent quality goes from low to high.  This means that as 
the quality of the superintendent decreases, the effect of principal quality on 
performance increases around 3%.  As superintendent quality increases, the effect of 
principal quality on performance decreases.  Although middle manager quality matters 
more when superintendent quality is low, the impact of superintendent quality on this 
relationship is still very small.  Figure 4.1 illustrates this relationship.   
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Table 4.4: The Marginal Effects of Principal Quality at Various 
Levels of Superintendent Quality 
Note: A quality score that is one standard deviation below the mean is low quality,  
medium quality is the mean, and high quality is one standard deviation above the mean. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Marginal Effects of Middle Manager Quality on TAAS/TAKS  
Pass Rates 
 
 
 
 
The effect of superintendent quality for any value of principal quality is: 
Slope = 0.33 – 0.03 x Principal quality 
The marginal effects of superintendent quality depending on various levels of middle 
manager quality are presented in Table 4.5. 
Performance Measure Low Medium High
TAAS 1.07 1.04 1.01
College Ready 2.14 2.69 3.20
Superintendent Quality
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Table 4.5: The Marginal Effects of Superintendent Quality at  
Various Levels of Principal Quality 
Note: A quality score that is one standard deviation below the mean is low quality,  
medium quality is the mean, and high quality is one standard deviation above the mean. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Marginal Effects of Superintendent Quality on TAAS/TAKS  
Pass Rates  
 
 
 
 
 The impact of superintendent quality on performance changes from 0.36 to 0.30 
as principal quality goes from low to high.  This means that as principal quality 
decreases, the effect of superintendent quality on performance increases by 11%.  Figure 
4.2 illustrates this relationship.  As show in Figure 4.2, the impact of superintendent 
Performance Measure Low Medium High
TAAS 0.36 0.33 0.30
College Ready -0.08 0.45 0.98
Principal Quality
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quality is no longer significant when principal quality is high (more than 1 standard 
deviation above the mean).  This means that when principal quality is high, 
superintendent quality does not have a significant impact on performance. 
These results, taken together, reveal an interesting relationship between upper 
and middle level management.  First, the interaction of principals and superintendents 
can result in diminishing returns for TAAS/TAKS pass rates.  When management 
quality at both levels has a positive impact on performance separately, their combined 
impact on performance may not lead to an even greater impact.  Rather, they may 
undercut each other’s efforts and end up hurting performance instead of helping it.  This 
happens when quality at one level is high—the effect of the other level does not matter 
so much for performance.  However, when the quality of one managerial level is low, 
the effect of the other managerial level matters more to an organization.  This means that 
quality managers compensate for low quality managers.  For standardized test scores, 
there is support for hypothesis 2b. 
College Readiness 
As presented in Table 4.4, the effect of middle management quality on the 
percentage of students who are college ready changes from 2.14 to 3.20 when 
superintendent quality goes from low to high—an increase of 44%.  In other words, the 
effect of principal quality increases as superintendent quality increases; superintendent 
quality increases the effect of middle management quality on performance.  Figure 4.3 
illustrates this relationship. 
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In regards to the marginal effects of superintendent quality, the impact of 
superintendent quality changes from -0.08 to 0.98 when principal quality goes from low 
to high.  The effect of superintendent quality increases as principal quality increases.  
Figure 4.4 illustrates the effect of superintendent quality on performance as middle 
manager quality increases.  Note, as shown in Figure 4.4, that superintendent quality 
only has a significant impact when principal quality is at least average.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Marginal Effects of Middle Manager Quality on College  
Ready Students 
 
 
 
 
 
The results for this performance measure indicate that the interaction of principal 
and superintendent quality can have an even bigger impact on performance if they are 
quality managers. Indeed, this impact can be quite large, where the effect of manager 
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quality on performance changes from no effect to a positive effect as middle manager 
quality moves from low to high.  The interaction of middle and upper level management 
can make the impact of management on performance even greater. For college readiness, 
there is support for hypothesis 2a; there is a complementing relationship. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Marginal Effects of Superintendent Quality on College Ready Students 
 
 
 
 
Attendance 
According to the results presented in Table 4.3, the impact of management 
quality at both levels on attendance rates is very small.  The impact of management 
quality at either level on attendance rates does not change as the quality of the other 
level changes.  For this performance measure, neither of the relationships presented in 
hypothesis 2 are supported. 
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Summary of Hypothesis 2 Results 
 When testing hypothesis 2, the expectation was that either compensation or 
complementing would occur for all performance measures.  Instead, a compensating 
relationship was found for the standardized test measure and a complementing 
relationship for college readiness.  While this is unexpected, it is not surprising when we 
consider the differences between the two performance measures.  Performance on the 
standardized test is the focus of all districts.  Districts care about standardized test scores 
because their funding and reputation rely on them. Since standardized test scores are a 
priority, district procedures, goals, and resources are all aimed at test scores and do not 
change much. Moreover, since the procedures remain the same, when one level of 
management is not doing their job well, the other level of management knows enough to 
step in to prevent performance from slipping too much. 
College readiness, on the other hand, is a priority only if the district makes it one.  
If the district does make college readiness a priority, it requires additional resources (i.e. 
time and money) because teaching students the skills they need to succeed in college is 
different from teaching kids the basic skills the standardized test covers.  
Communicating with parents and students about the importance of taking the test takes 
time and effort on the part of the organization. Moreover, managers will need to work 
with teachers, the community, and parents to gain additional resources.  These additional 
resources include resources for after school prep classes such as the teachers to teach 
them and classroom space to teach them in, and funding so low-income can afford to 
take the test. The task is not just preparing students for college and all that entails, it is 
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also ensuring students continue to perform well on the standardized test.  Such a task 
requires teamwork.   
When the task is considered, the results are not surprising.  When the 
performance measure is the main task of the organization, the goals and the procedures 
used to reach those goals are ingrained in the organization—the majority of resources 
(both human and financial) are spent on them. When the task is not the main goal of the 
organization, however, the organization needs to work together to gather and effectively 
utilize the necessary resources to succeed.     
An examination of the relationship between top and middle managers 
demonstrates that managers at one level influence managers at another level, and that 
this has an impact on organization performance.  Moreover, depending on the task, the 
interaction of management can affect performance in an even bigger way (college ready 
students), it can result in diminishing returns, or it can lead to compensation by one level 
of management for poor management at another level (standardized test pass rates).  The 
relationship between management levels is complex and the results show that how we 
study management can lead to different conclusions about the effect of management on 
performance.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter makes three contributions to the public management literature.  
First, it is the offers the first empirical study of the impact of middle managers. It 
demonstrates that middle manager quality has a significant and positive impact on two 
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out of three organizational performance indicators. The measure of middle manager 
quality presented in this chapter allows researchers to actually explore empirically for 
the first time the myriad ways middle managers affect an organization. Although a large 
body of research has stressed the importance of quality upper level management to 
organizational performance and the many ways that upper level management matters to 
an organization, the research presented here demonstrates the significant impact of 
middle management on organizational performance. 
 Middle managers have an even larger impact on organizations than upper level 
management for several reasons.  Intuitively, this makes sense for several reasons.  The 
first reason is problem solving.  Upper level managers are tasked with solving big 
problems that are oftentimes unsolvable.  If a problem does have a solution, the real 
impact comes not from the solution but from those who implement the solution—middle 
managers.  Conversely, mid-level managers get smaller—and more likely solvable—
problems.  The decisions middle managers make about the solutions to these small 
problems and the implementation of solutions from upper level management can have a 
greater cumulative impact on an organization than those decisions made at the upper 
levels of government.  This is because middle managers are more involved with the day-
to-day operations of the organization than upper level managers are.  Middle managers 
affect the organization on a weekly or daily basis by solving small problems and 
implementing solutions. 
The second reason middle managers have a greater impact on an organization 
than upper level managers is the relationship middle managers have with front-line 
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workers.  Front line workers are the ‘producers’ of the organization; they create/provide 
the organization’s products/services.  So, middle managers have a greater impact on the 
organization than upper level managers not only because they solve more immediate and 
important problems, but because they have more contact with, and thus a greater impact, 
on the front line workers who are directly responsible for organizational performance. 
The third reason middle managers matter more to an organization is politics.  
Superintendents have to deal with politics to garner constituency support in order to 
continue to be effective in providing services and to maintain the necessary support of 
political actors.  As a result, they have less time for management.  The responsibility for 
management falls to middle managers who pick up the slack.  Middle managers have a 
greater impact on organizational performance than superintendents simply because they 
manage the organization more than superintendents.   
These three reasons for why middle managers can have a greater influence on an 
organization than upper level managers illustrates that the expansion of public 
management research to include middle managers is possible, essential, and beneficial to 
understanding the complex ways in which management affects organizational 
performance.  The effect of management on performance is more complex than scholars 
have envisioned.  When management at one level is poor, management at the other level 
can compensate.  When the quality of both management levels is high, middle and 
upper-level managers both have a larger impact on performance (although there is a 
chance of diminished returns).   
 84 
Management matters more than we think and in interesting ways.  By looking at 
more than one level of management, the results in this chapter reveal that only 
examining one level of an organization understates the importance of management in an 
organization. Moreover, the relationship between the managerial levels can lead to even 
better performance.  The question is no longer simply if management matters but how 
and when it matters.  The inclusion of middle managers in the study of public 
management helps answer that question.  
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CHAPTER V 
HOW MANAGEMENT MATTERS: 
THE EFFECT OF MIDDLE MANAGERS ON TURNOVER 
 
Overview 
The literature on public management explores the roles of public managers and 
their effect on public organizations.  Although this research tells us that management 
matters, it does not demonstrate how management affects the organization; it simply 
argues that it does.  This chapter examines the effect of upper and middle level managers 
on street level bureaucrats’ decisions to stay with the organization—a decision that 
affects organizational performance.  Specifically, using a large n dataset of the most 
common public organization in the United States—school districts—I show that 
management at only one level of an organization—the middle level—has a significant 
and negative effect on teacher turnover; upper level management does not have an effect 
on turnover.  Moreover, middle management continues to have an effect on turnover 
when organizational size is taken into account.  Except for very large districts, middle 
management has a negative effect on turnover.  The results and their implications are 
discussed within the public management literature. 
 
Introduction 
Those who study public management are interested in “the interactions between 
managers and workers and the effects of management on workers and work outcomes” 
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(Frederickson and Smith 2003, 98).  However, the majority of research on public 
management research focuses on the effect of management on work outcomes (i.e. 
organizational performance) and not so much on the effect of management on the 
workers themselves (Meier and O’Toole 2002, 2001; Goerdel 2006; Brewer and Selden 
2000; Walker and Boyne 2006; Moynihan and Pandey 2005; see also Lynn, Heinrich, 
and Hill 2001; although see Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003).  This lack of attention 
to the effect of management on workers is puzzling because in order to understand the 
effect of management on performance, we need to understand its effect on workers since 
the workers are ultimately responsible for those work outcomes that comprise 
organizational performance.   
Therefore, in order to understand the effect of management on performance—or 
how management affects performance—we need to focus on the relationship between 
management and the workers. One of the core functions of management is human 
resources management (Daley 2005). Human resources management involves 
determining how to fulfill workplace needs, acquiring the necessary people, developing 
their skills, and motivating and rewarding employees (Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 
2003).  Essentially, human resources management is about the hiring, improvement, and 
motivation of employees.  Human capital is one of the most significant resources an 
organization has and its effective management positively influences organizational 
performance (Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003; Daley 2005).   
The literature tells us that the management of human capital matters for 
performance.   However, we know little about its effect on those being managed.  If we 
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want to fully understand the interaction between management and work outcomes, we 
need to focus on the missing link—the workers.  Thus, in determining how management 
matters, the question becomes, what effect does management have on workers?  
To answer this question, I focus on the effect of management on the turnover of 
street level.  Turnover is highly correlated with job satisfaction and job satisfaction is 
essential to organizational effectiveness and performance.  When job satisfaction is low, 
workers are more likely to leave the organization.  Turnover is considered to be mostly a 
bad thing for organizations and something that must be managed (Mobley 1982).   
Management in this chapter is multilevel, where both top and middle level 
managers each affect turnover.  This distinction is important because the effect of 
management differs depending on the level one is at in the organization (Riccucci 2005). 
The next section discusses the consequences and causes of turnover.  This is followed 
with a discussion of the tasks managers perform that affect turnover and how a 
characteristic of the organization—organizational size—can affect the ability of 
management to impact turnover.   
 
Consequences and Causes of Turnover 
To determine the effect of management on workers, we can look to how 
management affects workers’ job satisfaction as measured with the retention (turnover) 
rate of street level bureaucrats in the organization. Indeed, high turnover negatively 
affects performance (Meier and Hicklin 2008; Brill and McCartney 2008). Turnover is 
important because it leads to significant costs in terms of lost recruiting, interviewing, 
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training, and socialization investments (Mobley 1982).  Turnover also affects the morale 
of the organization (Rainey 2003) and disrupts its social and communication patterns 
(Mobley 1982).  Turnover disrupts an organization by taking time away from its core 
goals by diverting its resources—both of which has an impact on the effectiveness of the 
organization.   
The causes of turnover can be external, organizational, or personal.  External 
causes are beyond the control of the manager.  They include the state of the economy, 
inflation, and the composition of the labor force.  These factors do not determine who 
leaves or for what specific reasons.  Instead, they are correlated with turnover as a sign 
of the economic times.  Simply, when economic times are good, it is easier to find 
another job if one is unhappy with the current job. 
Turnover is also affected by organizational factors such as the size of the 
organization, the size of the department, the job task, and salary (Mobley 1982).  
Organizational size affects turnover because larger organizations have more 
opportunities for advancement, more competitive pay systems, and human resources 
departments dedicated to turnover.  The size of the department matters because of the 
sense of belonging, personalization, and communication that occurs.  In this case, 
smaller departments are likely to have lower turnover. The characteristics of the job, 
which includes task repetitiveness, job autonomy, and responsibility, all affect job 
satisfaction, which affects turnover.   
The compensation workers receive is a strong predictor of turnover (Mobley 
1982; Moynihan and Pandey 2008; Selden and Moynihan 2000; Theobald 1990).  More 
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importantly, however, is not so much the pay itself but satisfaction with pay.  
Satisfaction with pay is a function of how much a worker is paid in comparison to the 
area.  Satisfaction with pay relates to cost of living; it occurs in areas where worker 
salaries are on par with others in the surrounding area.      
There are other fiscal resources besides pay that influence turnover, namely the 
fiscal resources of the organization.  The fiscal resources of an organization matter 
because an organization with more resources is more likely to provide supplies, training, 
and other resources that better enable workers to do their jobs. Resources for job 
training, technology, and even office supplies affect job satisfaction and satisfaction with 
working conditions, which affects turnover (Mobley 1982).  
In addition to organizational and external factors, there are individual level 
factors that are associated with turnover.  These factors relate to the level of satisfaction 
workers have not only with their jobs overall but with pay, the job, coworkers, and the 
boss (Mobley 1982).  The opportunity for advancement and employee development 
affects job satisfaction, as does the way workers are treated by the organization 
generally. Job satisfaction is a reflection of worker perceptions about how they are 
treated by the organization (Moynihan and Pandey 2008).  Managers are responsible for 
the working conditions that affect job satisfaction and thus turnover (Nigro, Nigro, and 
Kellough 2007). These conditions include establishing clear goals, providing 
advancement opportunities, and assigning challenging tasks to workers.  Managers 
influence turnover because they can affect the individual and organizational factors 
associated with turnover. 
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Turnover and Management 
Turnover is something that must be managed (Mobley 1982).  Human resources 
management influences organizational performance because it affects the job satisfaction 
of street level bureaucrats.  This is important to organizations because it heavily 
influences the effectiveness of an organization and effective organizations perform well 
(Mobley 1982; Riccucci 2005). So why look at job satisfaction and turnover? Some 
research argues that managers should not affect front-line workers’ behavior because 
their behavior is defined in large part by organizational norms and shortcuts (Riccucci 
2005).  As such, to determine the influence of management on workers, we have to look 
at something managers can impact.  Management does, however, have an impact on job 
satisfaction because, while management may not be able to affect what workers do, they 
can prevent workers from being dissatisfied with their jobs (Riccucci 2005).  Managers, 
in how they interact and work with those lower in the organization, have an influence on 
job satisfaction and turnover.  
As already noted, the most important factor associated with turnover is job 
satisfaction (Mobley 1982; Morrell, Loan-Clarke, and Wilkinson 2001).  Job satisfaction 
is a subjective attitude about how the organization treats its workers.  This includes 
satisfaction with pay, satisfaction with the opportunity for advancement, with the job (in 
terms of job support, autonomy, and challenge), goal clarity, and satisfaction with 
supervisors (Mobley 1982), all of which management influences.  
Managers influence turnover in several ways.  One way managers affect job 
satisfaction (and thus turnover) is by hiring well (Pynes 2004; Mobley 1982).  Hiring 
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workers who fit with the organization goes a long way to ensure that the worker is 
satisfied with the job and the organization and has the necessary skills (both technical 
and communicative) to keep the worker in the organization. Moreover, managers are 
responsible for the professional development of workers. Managers can have an impact 
on job satisfaction by providing workers with the training and opportunities that allow 
workers to advance in an organization. Moreover, the support workers have from 
management (Parker 2002; Moynihan and Pandey 2008) also matters.  All of these tasks 
comprise human resources management. 
Another core function of management—budgeting—also affects job satisfaction 
(Donahue et al. 2004).  There is a strong relationship between pay levels and turnover 
rates (Mobley 1982; Moynihan and Pandey 2008; Selden and Moynihan 2000; Theobald 
1990). Moreover, the effective management of an organization’s resources also matters 
because it allows workers to better able to get the job done.  Managers have an influence 
on this factor because they are responsible for budgeting and distributing organizational 
resources, including worker salaries, raises, and certain necessary worker supplies 
(Gulick 1937; Mintzberg 1979; Donahue et al. 2004). 
In addition to human resources management and budgeting, managers affect 
turnover because they are responsible for setting tasks and coordinating workers 
(Barnard 1938; Allison 1983; Gulick 1937). Managers determine the level of autonomy 
workers have.  They can offer direction to workers by micromanaging or by letting 
workers have the discretion to do their job; the way managers direct workers affects job 
satisfaction and turnover.  Moreover, the organization and coordination of tasks affect 
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the size of the work unit (the size of the worker’s immediate work community) (Brill and 
McCartney 2008).  In addition, managers affect the tasks workers perform because 
managers are responsible for setting the policies of one’s organization (Selden and 
Moynihan 2000; Mobley 1982; Nigro, Nigro, and Kellough 2007).  
Managers are also responsible for setting goals and motivating employees 
(Rainey 2003).  Goal clarity is important to workers’ job satisfaction (Mobley 1982).  
Managers have an impact on turnover by ensuring the goals of the organization are clear 
and in motivating employees (via either incentives or leadership or both).  The tasks 
managers perform within the organization (i.e. internal management) affect the causes of 
turnover related to the nature of the job.   
Multi-level Management 
We would expect management to have an impact on turnover for the reasons 
outlined above. Human resources management, budgeting, internal management, and 
goal setting affect worker perceptions of how an organization treats them.  However, the 
relationship between management and turnover is not so simple when we consider that 
governance systems are multilevel.  In multilevel systems, there are managers at 
different levels who have different effects on an organization (Riccucci 2005; Lynn, 
Heinrich, and Hill 2001).  Thus, to really determine if management affects workers, we 
need to look at managers at more than one level and their effect on street level 
bureaucrats.  
The influence of management on turnover varies depending on the managerial 
level.  For example, managers at the top of the organization have more power over 
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budgets, especially salaries.  This affects not only salary but also satisfaction with salary.  
This may also affect money budgeted specifically for other benefits and incentives for 
workers such as raises, professional development, new technology, etc.  Upper level 
managers set the goals of the entire organization and not just one unit and thus can affect 
turnover that way. This leads me to my first hypothesis namely, that upper level 
managers will have an effect on turnover.  Specifically, 
Hypothesis 1: Upper level managers will have an impact on turnover. 
In addition, upper level managers have an effect on turnover through middle managers in 
that they are responsible for hiring lower level (i.e. middle) managers and in determining 
their power and autonomy in the organization.  
Middle managers are obviously closer to workers since they are the workers’ 
direct supervisor (Mintzberg 1979; Barnard 1938).  Since middle managers are closest to 
the workers, what middle managers do is likely to have a more direct influence on 
workers’ overall job satisfaction with the organization.  My second hypothesis is that 
middle level managers will have an effect on turnover.  Specifically, 
Hypothesis 2: Middle level managers will have an impact on turnover.   
Middle managers are likely to be better at motivating workers and ensuring that the 
workers know the goals of the organization (and the work unit) and that the goals are 
clear.  Middle managers are responsible for human resources management; they 
implement the professional development and training of workers and hire the workers.  
In directing workers, they affect the tasks workers perform.   
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Organizational Size 
This chapter hypothesizes that each level of management affects turnover.  
However, to better understand how management affects an organization, it is important 
to explore the conditions under which it may matter more or less.  Organizational size 
may affect the importance of management.  This is because larger organizations are 
more structurally complex, which increases the division of labor (Rainey 2003).  In 
larger organizations, the selection and placement of employees and their training, 
socialization, and supervision are routinized through a specialized department like 
human resources (Williamson 1975; Barber et al. 1999; Aldrich and Auster 1986) 
whereas smaller organizations rely on management (Barber et al. 1999; Aldrich and 
Auster 1986).  Thus, we would expect management to matter to turnover in smaller 
organizations but not larger ones.  This leads me to my third hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Management will have an impact on turnover in smaller 
organizations but not in larger organizations. 
However, in larger organizations the routinization of processes—the human 
resources division—still needs to be managed.  Thus, management may still matter in 
large organizations (i.e. hypothesis 3 is not supported).  If hypothesis 3 is not supported 
and management matters to turnover in both small and large organizations, then there is 
an additional hypothesis about the relationship between organizational size, 
management, and turnover.  Specifically, for large organizations: 
Hypothesis 4a: In large organizations, upper level management will have an 
impact on turnover.    
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Upper level managers are responsible for putting into place and maintaining the 
organization-wide system of human resources.  Thus, in larger organizations, if 
management matters to turnover, the upper level managers are the ones that matter.  
In smaller organizations, the human resource function is still performed by 
management.  Since there is less routinization of the human resources function in 
smaller organizations, management at both levels should matter to turnover.  
Specifically, 
Hypothesis 4b: In small organizations, upper level and middle level management 
will have an impact on turnover.     
The purpose of this chapter is to not only to determine if upper and middle 
management affects turnover of street level bureaucrats but also how the effect of 
management may change depending on organizational size.  In order to do so, the next 
step is to come up with a way to test my hypotheses about management, turnover, and 
organizational size.  
 
Data and Methods 
To determine the effect of management on turnover I require three things in 
terms of data.  The first requirement is that the dataset have comparable measures of 
both upper and middle level management across many organizations.  The second 
requirement is that the dataset have a measure of street level bureaucrat turnover for the 
same organizations.  The third requirement is that these measures of management and 
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turnover exist for the same organizations over time so that I can establish causality 
between management and turnover.       
With these requirements in mind, I use a dataset that focuses on the most 
common public organization in the United States—school districts.  Specifically, the 
dataset includes information on over 1,000 school districts in Texas from 2000 through 
2005.  School districts are local independent government organizations that provide free 
public education for grades K-12. A locally elected school board oversees school 
districts, sets overall policies and budgets, and hires a professionally trained 
superintendent to manage the district. School districts have a fairly decentralized 
hierarchical organizational structure with a superintendent at the top, principals in the 
middle, and teachers serving as street-level bureaucrats. Those working in the school 
district organization are highly professional with certification in many occupations. 
There is discretion at each level in the school district, with the most discretion at 
the street-level. Superintendents have the authority to establish district and school-level 
policies including the hiring and firing of principals in the district, budgets, and policies 
and programs.  Due to weak teacher unions in Texas, principals have the ability to hire 
and fire teachers.  For their part, teachers have the ability to leave at the end of the year 
for any reason.  The average district turnover is 17% per year with a standard deviation 
of 8.18.  Annual turnover rates range from 0 to 100%.19  Although the average turnover 
for school districts is slightly higher than the turnover rate for the U.S. federal 
                                                
19 This district had only four teachers.   
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government (16.1%), it is still similar to turnover rates in other public organizations 
(Office of Personnel Management 2008).  
The advantage to using this dataset is that it provides variation across 
organizations and across time as well. Texas is a diverse state and so too are its school 
districts.  There is variation in terms of location (rural, suburban, and urban), racial 
makeup (multiracial to one race), income, and size (less than 1,000 students to more than 
200,000 students). The average school district employs 533 full time employees, with a 
range of 6 to 29,711.  Having data for the same organizations over time allows me to 
explore the relationship between management and turnover. Moreover, the dataset 
includes measures of management at both the top (superintendents) and the middle 
(principals).   
Management 
I argue that managers have an affect on turnover.  Specifically, good managers 
will reduce turnover and bad managers will face higher levels of turnover.  Since 
organizations have more than one level of management, to determine the effect of 
management on turnover, I need to consider managers at multiple levels.  In this chapter, 
I look at upper-level managers and middle managers. 
Upper-level Management 
Superintendents affect teacher turnover directly and indirectly.  Directly, 
superintendents set the goals of the district and ensure that principals have what the 
school, and by extension, what teachers need to do their job.  They are also responsible 
for the school district budget, which has an impact on teacher salaries.  Indirectly, 
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superintendents have an impact on teacher turnover because they are responsible for 
hiring the principals who are in charge of and in direct contact with teachers.   
The measure of upper management is superintendent quality. This measure was 
created from the residuals of a model predicting superintendent salary.  Superintendents 
participate in a competitive labor market where the market rewards better (i.e. quality) 
superintendents with higher salaries.  To get at this managerial quality component, Meier 
and O’Toole (2002) predicted the logged superintendent salaries with variables that 
measure district financial resources, job size, past performance, and the personal and 
professional characteristics of superintendents. Values of superintendent quality range 
from -5 to 5, where positive values mean superintendent quality is high.  This measure 
has been used to determine the effect of management on school performance (Meier and 
O’Toole 2002).   
Middle Management 
 Middle managers in school districts are principals (Hayes 2004).  They reside in 
the middle of the organization, between the superintendent and teachers.  The tasks they 
perform are management tasks.  They coordinate with the rest of the district (i.e. 
teachers, staff, other principals, and the superintendent), the community, parents, and 
students when making decisions regarding budgets, schedules, and the creation and 
implementation of new policies.  They are responsible for hiring, evaluating, and the 
improvement of teachers and staff.  They report to the community and district 
administrators on the performance of their school.  They set the tone of the school, 
provide goals, and ensure that teachers have what they need (in terms of supplies, 
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information, and skills) to do their job well (Hayes 2004; Smith and Andrews 1989; 
Sergiovanni 2001). 
 The measure of principal quality is constructed in the same way as 
superintendent quality (see Meier and O’Toole 2002); I created a measure of middle 
management with a residual-based model explaining the average salary of principals in a 
district. There are two steps to creating this measure.  However, before creating the 
measure, it is important that the idea behind the superintendent quality measure—that 
there is a competitive labor market for superintendents where good superintendents are 
rewarded—also exists for principals.  Although not all principals participate in the 
market, there is a market for principals in the margins.  These marginal consumers (i.e. 
districts) drive the market.  Those districts that want to attract quality principals and 
identify them will create a market for principals that keeps the salary of all principals 
competitive (Schneider, Teske, and Marschall 2000).    
The first step in creating a measure of principal quality is to model logged 
average principal salary.  Average principal salary is used here because the unit of 
analysis is the district.  There are four groups of factors related to the job that affect 
salary (Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg 1988a,b).  These factors are district 
characteristics (such as the district tax rate, expenditures, and revenue), human capital 
factors (such as education, experience, and age), personal characteristics (such as race 
and gender), and past performance.  Nine measures of these factors are included in the 
model predicting logged average principal salary.    
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The second step in creating a measure of principal quality is to predict and 
standardize the residuals from the model predicting principal salary.  By standardizing, 
the residuals are converted to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.  The 
standardized residuals range from -3 to 3 where a value of 0 is average.  Negative values 
are associated with below average middle manager quality and positive values are 
associated with above average middle manager quality.  Because both principal quality 
and superintendent quality are standardized, they are directly comparable.  The 
management quality variables allow me to determine the effect of management at 
multiple levels on turnover. 
Turnover 
Management affects both voluntary and involuntarily turnover.  The assumption 
is that good managers would not need to fire workers (because they hired good workers 
to begin with) and that workers would not want to leave because they are satisfied with 
their jobs. High turnover signals several things.  First, high turnover is a sign of poor 
hiring (i.e. bad management) in that managers end up firing bad workers, or workers 
leave because they are a bad fit for the organization.  Second, turnover may be a sign 
that teachers are unsatisfied or unhappy with management. Regardless of the scenario, 
good management should decrease turnover while bad management should increase 
turnover. 
 To understand how management affects an organization, we need to determine 
how managers affect those who are responsible for organizational performance. In the 
case of school districts, these street level bureaucrats are teachers.  Teachers perform the 
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work that leads directly to organizational outcomes. The measure of teacher turnover is 
the percentage of teachers who were not working for the district at the start of the current 
year but were employed by the district at the start of the previous year.  Simply, this 
measure is the percentage of teachers who leave the school district in a given year.  It 
includes all of those teachers who left for any reason.  By measuring turnover this way, 
it prevents growing districts that hire a large number of new teachers from inflating the 
measure.  Higher numbers indicate higher turnover.   
Organizational Size 
 To explore the effect of organizational size on the effectiveness of management 
on turnover, I split the sample into large and small organizations.  The number of 
teachers in a district ranges from 2 to over 12,000.  I log this measure due to the extreme 
variation in the number of teachers in districts.20  Large organizations are those districts 
that fall above the median value of teachers in the district and small districts are those 
that fall below the median.  This allows me to compare the effect of management on 
turnover in small and large organizations.         
Control Variables 
 It is possible that turnover in one year will affect turnover the next year. For 
example, a district with bad management brings in new managers to improve things 
Those new managers come into the organization and change things by firing bad 
teachers and hiring new teachers.  The next year, not many people may have to be let go.  
In this example, high turnover one year may mean lower turnover the next year, and 
                                                
20 The average number of teachers in a district is 270 with a standard deviation of 750. 
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even lower turnover the next year as managers learn how to hire well and bad teachers 
leave.  To control for this, I include a lagged measure of teacher turnover in the model.  
In addition, because of the time series nature of the data, I include dummy variables for 
individual years.  
 As previously mentioned, there are other factors besides management that affect 
turnover.  I include measures of these factors to control for their effect on turnover.  The 
measures fall into three categories.  The first category includes fiscal resources. Fiscal 
resources are important because they determine teacher salary and the resources 
available to teachers in the classroom.  These measures are the average teacher salary in 
the district and the amount of money spent per student on instructional spending. In 
addition to salary and resources, the work environment outside of the organization 
matters.  If there are jobs available to teachers outside the organization that pay more, 
teachers may be more willing to leave the organization.  To account for this, I include a 
measure of the median family income for the district. For these three measures, the 
relationship with turnover should be negative. 
 A second category of factors is characteristics related to job satisfaction. In 
addition to the resources available to teachers in the classroom, job satisfaction relates to 
job support, the challenge of the job, and the autonomy workers have.  Job support is 
measured with average class size and the number of teacher’s aides per 100 students.  
Smaller classes allow teachers to have more personal contact with their students and 
makes class discipline easier.  Teacher’s aides support teachers in doing their job by 
providing an extra person in the classroom to ensure students get one-on-one attention, 
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to limit in-class disruption by students, and generally make teaching easier.  Moreover, 
having a large bureaucracy to deal with administrative tasks allows teachers to focus on 
their teaching instead of spending time on paperwork.  Conversely, a large bureaucracy 
may create more work for teachers in that larger bureaucracies are more likely to have 
formal and bureaucratic procedures (Blau 1972).  To control for the size of bureaucracy, 
I include a measure of the number of bureaucrats per 100 students. 
 In addition to the effect of job support on job satisfaction, a job where there is a 
sense of accomplishment that comes from making a difference in students’ lives matters.  
Student diversity in regards to race and class present teachers with a challenge in that 
they have to find effective ways of teaching students who face obstacles either in the 
form of parents who do not stress education at home or health problems that affect 
education (Jencks and Phillips 1998). Although teachers value a challenge, if a job 
becomes too difficult (or ‘impossible’), job satisfaction is negatively affected.   The job 
challenge variables are indicators of student diversity. These three indicators are the 
percentages of students who are eligible for free or reduced price lunches, the percentage 
of black students, and the percentage of Latino students in the school district.  
Also associated with the challenge of the job is the experience of the teacher.  
Teachers with more experience will have ways of effectively helping students and so 
their job may not be as challenging.  Moreover, the longer a teacher is in a district, the 
more ties that teacher has to the district and the community.  Although the challenge of 
the job may not be as great, because of the connection they have with the district, 
experienced teachers will be less likely to leave.  There are less likely to be dissatisfied 
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because dissatisfied workers would have already left the organization.  This variable is 
the percentage of teachers in a district with more than six years of experience.      
The performance of the district also matters.  Performing a job well done brings 
with it a sense of accomplishment that is important to job satisfaction.  Thus, teachers in 
well performing districts are less likely to be dissatisfied and leave the organization.  
Thee most salient performance measure in Texas is student performance on the state 
standardized test.  This measure is the percentage of students in a district who passed the 
standardized test.   
 
Results 
The Effect of Upper and Middle Management on Turnover 
 Recall that hypothesis 1 posits that upper level management will have an effect 
on turnover and hypothesis 2 posits that middle management will affect turnover.  The 
results of the model testing these two hypotheses are presented in Table 5.1.   
The main variables of interest are the measures of management.  The argument 
presented in this chapter is that management has an affect on teacher turnover but that 
the effects of management on turnover may differ depending on the management level.  
The results of the model provide support for hypothesis 2 (middle management) but do 
not support hypothesis 1 (upper management).  Middle manager quality has a negative 
and significant effect on teacher turnover.  A one standard deviation increase in middle 
manager quality decreases turnover by 1.66 percentage points.  This is a large effect; 
principal quality reduces turnover by 11 percent.  Conversely, the effect of 
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superintendents on turnover is not a significant predictor of turnover.  Middle managers 
have an effect on turnover and upper level managers do not. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: The Effect of Upper and Middle Level 
 Manager Quality on Teacher Turnover 
Note: Dependent variable is the percentage of teachers who left the school district.   
Bolded coefficients are significant at p>0.05.  Coefficients for individual year dummies  
are not reported.  
 
 
Coefficient Std. Error
Management
Superintendent quality -0.004 0.103
Middle manager quality -1.66 0.175
Resources
Avg. Teacher salary -2.56 0.593
Median family income 0.03 0.007
Instructional funds 0.001 0.0002
Job Support
Avg. Class Size 0.647 0.109
Teachers aides -0.071 0.025
Ratio of Staff to Students -0.686 0.182
Job Challenge
% Black students 0.074 0.011
% Latino students 0.022 0.007
% Low-income students -0.032 0.011
Avg. Teacher experience -0.678 0.055
Performance
TAAS/TAKS pass rate -0.127 0.013
Lagged turnover 0.257 0.014
Constant 25.58 4.231
N
Adj. R-square
F
Root MSE
4779
0.288
102.71
6.6115
 106 
The effect of the control variables on turnover is also notable.  The factor with 
the largest influence on turnover is average teacher salary.  As expected, as average 
salary increases, turnover decreases.  Conversely, as the median family income in a 
district increases, turnover increases.  This makes sense because teachers who live in 
wealthier districts may find another position outside the organization where the pay is 
better.  Surprisingly, the percent of instructional expenditures spent in each district on 
students has a positive impact on turnover.  This is because resources spent on 
instruction mean fewer resources for other important things such as teacher salary.   
 The measures of job support are in the expected direction. As class size 
increases, turnover increases.  Larger classes make teachers’ jobs harder.  When there 
are more teachers’ aides, turnover decreases because teacher’s aides make teacher’s jobs 
easier.  When the size of bureaucracy increases, turnover also decreases.  This is because 
teachers can spend less time doing paperwork and navigating the bureaucracy and focus 
on just doing their job.  When teachers have job support, they are less likely to leave the 
organization. 
 The job challenge variables are not as expected.  A challenging job is important 
for job satisfaction but the three main measures do not show this to be case.  The 
percentage of low-income students has a significant and negative effect on turnover.  
However, the variables measuring black and Latino students are significant and positive. 
Oddly, while low-income students (and the challenge they pose to teachers) decrease 
turnover, black and Latino students appear to increase turnover.  Perhaps for these 
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students, the job is too challenging.  Last, as expected, teacher experience has a negative 
effect on turnover. 
 The effect of performance on turnover is significant and negative.  The effect of 
performance on turnover is not very large.  A one-percentage point increase in test 
scores decreases turnover by less 0.13 percent.  In regards to the lagged dependent 
variable, the effect of the previous year’s turnover rate on turnover in the current year is 
significant and positive.  This means that districts with high turnover in one year are 
likely to have higher turnover the next year.  This indicates that there are chronic 
problems that the organization has not dealt with.  This could be management related, 
the challenge of the job, or fiscal resources.  However, the model explains less than 30% 
of the variance in teacher turnover.  There may be other factors that affect turnover that 
could explain why the relationship between lagged turnover and turnover is positive.   
The Effect of Management on Turnover in Large and Small Organizations 
 As Table 5.1 demonstrates, middle management matters for turnover but upper 
level management does not.  However, due to the differences in large and small 
organizations, specifically the routinization of human resource management in large 
organizations, the impact of upper and middle management may vary depending on the 
size of the organization. Hypothesis 3 posits that management will matter for smaller 
organizations but not for large organizations.  Hypothesis 4a posits that upper level 
management affects turnover in large organizations and hypothesis 4b posits that both 
levels of management affect turnover in small organizations.  To test these hypotheses, 
recall that I split the sample by the median to get large and small organizations and ran 
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the same model as discussed above.  The results of these models are presented in Table 
5.2.   
In regards to hypothesis 3, management matters in both small and large 
organizations.  In small organizations, a one standard deviation increase in middle 
manager quality decreases turnover by 1.1 percent.  In large organizations, a one 
standard deviation increase in middle manager decreases turnover by almost 1.5 
percentage points.  With these results, I can reject hypothesis 3. Management matters to 
turnover regardless of the size of the organization.  Given this, hypothesis 4a is not 
supported; upper level management does not affect turnover in large organizations.  
Hypothesis 4b is partially supported—only one level of management affects small 
organizations.  In both large and small organizations, middle management has a 
significant influence on turnover.   
 There are a few differences in the results of the two models presented in Table 
5.2.  As in Table 5.1, average teacher salary has a significant and negative effect on 
teacher turnover.  Median family income is significant in larger districts but not in small 
districts.  This makes sense because in larger districts there are more external job 
opportunities if a teacher decided to leave the organization, in smaller districts there are 
likely to be less jobs for teachers to move to.  Instructional funds have a positive and 
significant effect on turnover in small organizations but not in large organizations.  I 
have no explanation for this finding. 
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Table 5.2: The Effect of Upper and Middle Level Management on Turnover  
in Small and Large Organizations 
Note: Dependent variable is the percentage of teachers who left the school district.   
Small districts are those that fall below the median number of teachers in the district.  Large districts are 
those that fall above the median number of teachers in the district.  
Bolded coefficients are significant at p>0.05. Coefficients for individual year dummies are not reported. 
 
 
 
 Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Management
Superintendent Quality -0.123 0.19 0.093 0.090
Middle Manager Quality -1.142 0.45 -1.444 0.162
Resources
Avg. Teacher salary -3.616 1.18 -2.244 0.489
Median family income 0.003 0.017 0.037 0.006
Instructional funds 0.0008 0.0003 0.001 0.0002
Job Support
Avg. Class Size 1.105 0.209 0.540 0.098
Teachers aides -0.128 0.041 -0.037 0.025
Ratio of Staff to Students -1.6 0.37 -0.203 0.142
Job Challenge
% Black students 0.096 0.022 0.04 0.009
% Latino students 0.041 0.012 -0.003 0.006
% Low-income students -0.058 0.019 0.011 0.011
Avg. Teacher experience -0.644 0.099 -0.607 0.055
Performance
TAAS/TAKS pass rate -0.141 0.021 -0.106 0.055
Lagged turnover 0.208 0.021 0.388 0.019
Constant 35.69 6.36 22.54 2.68
N
Adj. R-square
F
Root MSE
131.05
3.8536
LargeSmall
2487
0.4850
2283
0.2171
34.31
8.6183
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 In regards to the measures of job support, as in Table 5.1, average class size has a 
significant and positive effect on turnover.  Teachers’ aides have a significant and 
negative impact on turnover.  When the size of the bureaucracy increases, turnover 
decreases in smaller organizations but does not have a significant impact on turnover in 
larger districts.  Perhaps this is because in smaller organizations, an increase in 
bureaucracy makes it easier for teachers to do their jobs whereas in large districts a large 
bureaucracy already exists and thus any changes in the size of bureaucracy do not 
matter. 
 The results about the importance of the job challenge variables are different for 
large and small organizations, except for the percentage of black students in the district.  
In both models, and in Table 5.1, the percentage of black students in a district has a 
significant and positive effect on turnover.  The percentage of Latino students has a 
positive and significant effect on turnover in small districts but has no significant effect 
on turnover in large districts.  The percentage of low-income students in a district has a 
significant and negative effect on turnover in small districts but has no significant effect 
on turnover in large districts. These results for small organizations are similar to those in 
Table 5.1 but in large districts the percentage of Latino and low-income students are not 
significant predictors of teacher turnover.  Perhaps this is because in smaller districts the 
necessary programs and resources to help Latino and low-income students that are 
available in larger districts are not available in smaller districts.  Thus, teachers in 
smaller districts face a greater challenge in teaching them.  Moreover, as in Table 5.1, 
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average teacher experience has a significant and negative effect on turnover in both 
small and large districts.   
 The effect of district performance on turnover is significant and negative in both 
small and large districts.  As in Table 5.1, this effect is not very large.  For both large 
and small districts, a one percentage point increase in test scores decreases turnover by 
little more than 0.1 percent.  Lagged turnover has a positive and significant effect on 
turnover in both large and small organizations, just as in Table 5.1.  One large difference 
between the two models presented in Table 5.2 are the adjusted R-square statistics for 
the two models.  The statistic for the model with small districts is 0.22 whereas the 
statistic is 0.49.  This means that the model is a better fit for large districts than for small 
organizations.  Recall that the adjusted R-square statistic for the full sample is 0.29.       
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
These results are contrary to what the public administration literature tells us 
about organizational size.  Although in large organizations, the human resources 
department takes away the manager’s task of staffing, professional development, and 
addressing factors related to job satisfactions such as opportunity for advancement and 
the job task, management still exerts an impact on turnover.  
The findings of this study also have implications for what we know about public 
management and how it affects an organization.  Different levels of management have 
different effects on an organization (Riccucci 2005) and in the case of turnover, it is 
middle managers that matter not upper level managers. In other words, by looking at 
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management at different levels, I demonstrate that managerial quality matters for 
turnover at the middle but not at the top.  This illustrates the importance of considering 
multiple managerial levels when exploring any effect of management on the 
organization or organizational performance.  Otherwise, we miss important information 
about the effect of management. 
Accordingly, we need to be mindful of the big picture when looking at the effect 
of management.  Specifically, we need to consider the structure of the governance 
system and how the levels interact with one another.  Although there is not a significant 
direct effect of upper level management on turnover, there is an indirect effect of upper 
level management quality on turnover.  Upper level managers are responsible for the 
hiring and firing of middle managers and quality upper level managers hire quality 
middle managers.  Therefore, while middle managers have a direct effect on turnover, 
upper level managers affect turnover because of the people they place into middle 
management.  
This study demonstrates that management, specifically middle management, has 
a negative and significant impact on worker turnover.  Only one factor has a larger effect 
on turnover than management and that is teacher salary.  Moreover, the effect of middle 
management persists even in large organizations where managing should not matter due 
to the routinization of the human resources management function.   
Middle managers are crucial to the welfare of organizations.  They have an effect 
on organizational performance (Brewer 2005) and within the organization itself.  We 
know now how management affects an organization by focusing on its effect on 
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workers.  We also better understand the effect of management on an organization by 
looking at management at different managerial levels and its impact on an organization. 
Moreover, by studying management in this way, we are able to understand not only 
whether management matters but how it matters as well.   
 
 114 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
Decision making is often studied in political science but the consequences of 
those decisions are studied less so.  Perhaps this is because there are many actors and 
institutions involved in the political process.  There are political institutions such as 
Congresses and parliaments, bureaucracies, and the position of the executive.  Voters, 
legislators, political candidates, bureaucrats, and lobbyists are all actors involved in the 
political process.  The study of decision making is even more difficult when we consider 
the political process as a whole.  There are several stages in the political process.  There 
is the initial stage where potential legislators are making decisions to positively 
influence citizens.  Only by making decisions that have positive consequences can 
political candidates formally engage in politics. There is the policy making stage where 
legislators and institutions make decisions about laws and policies.  And there is the 
stage where the decisions of bureaucrats determines how laws and policies are 
implemented. 
This dissertation focuses on two sets of actors.  First, it focuses on those actors at 
the start of the political process—the persons campaigning to become legislators—and 
the effect of their decisions on the electorate.  Second, the dissertation examines the 
effect of actors at the implementation stage, namely the effect of bureaucrats on their 
organizations.  In regards to political candidates, the results presented in the dissertation 
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find that candidate decisions affect voter perceptions of the candidates.  In regards to 
bureaucrats, the findings of the dissertation indicate that middle managers matter.   
Although the dissertation finds that the decisions’ actors make within the 
political process have intended and positive consequences, it also finds that the 
consequences are not always what decision makers think they will be.  Specifically, we 
see evidence of this in Chapters II and III.  Candidate decisions to influence voters either 
backfired (Gore’s appeals to Latino voters in Chapter III) or had negative consequences 
as we see in Chapter II when the candidates attempted to co-opt the other candidate’s 
issues. 
The dissertation also tells us that who the decision maker is matters when 
studying consequences.  This is because there is rarely one decision maker and by 
omitting other decision makers, the true consequences of decision making may be 
missed.  Therefore, it is important to consider other levels of decision makers.  Chapters 
IV and V look at the consequences of multiple decision makers.  The dissertation finds 
that the impact of management on performance changes when multiple levels of 
management are considered.   Additional work on the consequences of candidate 
decision making can take into account other decision makers by incorporating campaign 
managers into the analysis. 
In addition to highlighting the importance of considering multiple decision 
makers, the results of the dissertation demonstrate that outcomes depend not only on 
decision makers but on contextual factors as well.  Context includes factors such as 
organizational size, the nature of the job, the structure of the organization, how good 
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other decision makers are, and organizational resources among other things. Context 
matters because although decision makers utilize the same levers within their 
organizations (i.e. expertise, resources, communication skills, staff, etc.), the 
effectiveness of those levers changes depending on context. This is demonstrated most 
clearly in Chapters IV and V.    
However, the differences in context are also visible when comparing Chapters II 
and III with Chapters IV and V.  The structure of the campaign organization is more 
defined than in school districts. There are differences in necessary expertise.  In school 
districts, principals do a little bit of everything but in campaigns the job is more 
specialized (although this changes depending on the size of the campaign i.e. local vs. 
national).  The external environment is different as well, which occurs because of 
different incentives.  In Chapters II and III, a campaign is a competitive environment in 
which two forces (i.e. candidates) are working against each other to win the election.  In 
Chapters IV and V, everyone involved, including external actors, is working together for 
a common goal—educating students.  These contextual factors explain why two groups 
of decision makers, political candidates and bureaucrats, are less effective and more 
effective respectively.    
The study of politics is the study of the decisions of political actors and the 
consequences of those decisions. As this dissertation shows, the study of politics is not 
easy or simple; there are multiple actors across and within political organizations making 
decisions within varied contexts.  However, despite the difficulty, studying multiple 
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decision makers within varying contexts offers political scientists a greater 
understanding of how and why we have the political outcomes we do.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: Models Predicting Average Weekly Trait Perceptions of Bush with 
Individual Issue Ads 
Note: Dependent Variable is average weekly trait perceptions of Bush’s traits.  Values range from 1-4.  
Method is OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995).  Bolded coefficients are 
significant at p > 0.05 
 
 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Traits
Leadership -0.016 0.062 0.011 0.010 0.017 0.038
Morality 0.054 0.060 0.106 0.189 0.207 0.043
Issues
Taxes 0.046 0.046 0.111 0.072 0.076 0.028
Deficit/Surplus 0.006 0.026 -0.020 0.066 0.036 0.026
Education -0.015 0.011 -0.018 0.022 -0.030 0.021
Environment -0.061 0.077 0.138 0.125 -0.038 0.020
Health Care 0.033 0.040 -0.021 0.074 -0.008 0.029
Social Security -0.030 0.026 -0.047 0.069 -0.073 0.013
Children 0.029 0.035 0.016 0.046 -0.016 0.027
Medicare -0.042 0.053 0.062 0.102 0.035 0.037
Controls
Republican Convention 0.087 0.036 0.096 0.010
Democratic Convention -0.071 0.040 -0.137 0.055 -0.021 0.016
1st Debate 0.009 0.060 0.031 0.065 -0.008 0.027
2nd Debate 0.045 0.086 -0.012 0.092 -0.046 0.025
3rd Debate -0.032 0.094 -0.029 0.151 0.072 0.038
Lagged D.V. 0.285 0.018 0.354 0.039 0.269 0.019
Constant 1.709 0.042 1.86 0.119 1.89 0.049
N
Number of Groups
Wald Chi-square
Prob. Of Chi-square
61
Empathy Leadership Morality
2286 2283775
2092.80
0.001
1133.00
0.001
61
404.57
0.001
61
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Table A.2: Models Predicting Average Weekly Trait Perceptions of Gore with 
Individual Issue Ads 
Note: Dependent Variable is average weekly trait perceptions of Gore’s traits.  Values range from 1-4.  
Method is OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995).  Bolded coefficients are 
significant at p > 0.05 
 
 
 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Traits
Empathy 0.301 0.542 -0.038 0.315 0.150 0.385
Leadership 0.001 0.104 0.326 0.072 0.016 0.071
Morality -0.176 0.273 0.204 0.233 0.100 0.308
Issues
Taxes -0.073 0.056 -0.053 0.055 -0.091 0.037
Deficit/Surplus 0.124 0.082 0.023 0.089 0.057 0.102
Education 0.063 0.057 -0.004 0.062 -0.042 0.047
Environment -0.037 0.049 -0.032 0.061 0.034 0.058
Health Care 0.037 0.032 0.044 0.034 0.043 0.026
Social Security -0.007 0.069 0.017 0.098 0.022 0.070
Children 0.023 0.097 0.052 0.090 -0.017 0.084
Medicare 0.048 0.066 0.025 0.054 0.021 0.061
Controls
Republican Convention 0.072 0.049 -0.020 0.044
Democratic Convention 0.047 0.050 0.128 0.038 0.079 0.040
1st Debate -0.054 0.084 -0.026 0.091 -0.170 0.054
2nd Debate -0.153 0.089 -0.095 0.092 -0.122 .048
3rd Debate 0.111 0.049 0.099 0.056 0.098 0.025
Lagged D.V. 0.213 0.017 0.274 0.039 0.208 0.016
Constant 1.966 0.042 1.769 0.081 2.019 0.040
N
Number of Groups
Wald Chi-square
Prob. Of Chi-square
Empathy Leadership Morality
2288 775 2287
61 61 61
3196.08 117274.44 6405.88
0.001 0.001 0.001
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Table A.3: The Effect of Middle and Upper Level Management Quality on Other 
Performance Measures 
Note: All equations control for logged enrollment, average teacher salary, the percent of teachers with 
advanced degrees, average teacher experience, percentages of black, Latino, and low-income students, the 
percentage of state aid a district receives, average class size, past performance, and yearly dummies.  
Coefficients in bold are significant at p<0.05. 
 
Performance Measure Coefficient t-score Coefficient t-score Adj.R-sq. N
Latino Pass Rate 1.96 4.00 0.30 2.20 0.72 4461
Black Pass Rate 3.26 3.92 0.73 3.53 0.69 2963
Anglo Pass Rate 1.04 3.46 0.29 3.41 0.78 4719
Low Income Pass Rate 1.62 4.66 0.32 3.25 0.82 4762
Avg. ACT Score 0.26 3.44 0.05 2.52 0.54 3999
Avg. SAT Score 6.52 1.68 2.59 2.61 0.59 3206
% Taking SAT/ACT 4.30 5.69 0.18 0.89 0.40 4350
Dropout Rate -0.26 -1.54 -0.09 -2.01 0.46 4556
Quality
Middle Manager Superintendent
Quality
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